| ID | 187658 |
| Title Proper | Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability |
| Other Title Information | How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Paine, Jack ; Meng, Anne ; ANNE MENG |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Regimes founded in rebellion are, typically, extremely durable. We propose that this stability is founded upon peaceful power sharing between the rebel regime leader and military elites. Amid long and intense fighting, rebel leaders must delegate control to top military commanders because doing so helps them to win battles. After seizing power, power-sharing deals between former combatants are highly credible due to their history of interactions, which mitigates the guardianship dilemma. Elsewhere, a persistent internal security dilemma often undermines power-sharing deals. Using originally collected data on African regimes from 1960 to 2017, we establish that rebel regimes break down seldomly compared with other authoritarian regimes and they experience fewer coups. Regarding the mechanism, rebel regimes more frequently share power with military elites by appointing a Minister of Defense. These Ministers are typically high-ranking members of the rebellion, which reflects the regime’s replacement of the state military with their own. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 116, No.4; Nov 2022: p.1208 - 1225 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2022-12 116, 4 |
| Key Words | Power Sharing ; Guardianship Dilemma |