| ID | 187671 |
| Title Proper | Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma |
| Other Title Information | How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Paine, Jack |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Dictators confront a guardianship dilemma: military agents are needed to defeat mass outsider movements, but these agents can overthrow the ruler from within. In existing theories, rulers prioritize coup-proofing measures unless they anticipate strong outsider threats. Then dictators prioritize military competence. I reframe the guardianship dilemma around the central idea that militaries can choose between dual disloyalty options. In addition to staging a coup, militaries can defect by not fending off popular uprisings or rebellions. Dictators fear competent militaries not primarily because of their coup threat but instead because they often survive intact following a regime transition. Low motivation for competent militaries to save the ruler undermines their rationale of guarding against outsider threats, even if they pose a low coup threat. Consequently, rulers prioritize competence under narrow circumstances. Only radically oriented outsider movements that pose an existential threat to all regime elites induce loyalty from a competent military. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 116, No.4; Nov 2022: p.1425 - 1442 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2022-12 116, 4 |
| Key Words | Guardianship Dilemma ; Military’s Dual Disloyalty |