| ID | 187672 |
| Title Proper | Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from a Dominant Party Regime |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | RAFFLER, PIA J. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Concerned with poor service delivery, a large literature studies accountability of politicians to voters. This article instead considers accountability relationships within governments—the ability of politicians to implement policies by holding bureaucrats responsible for their actions. In collaboration with the Ugandan government, I conducted a field experiment across 260 local governments. The objective of the reform was to empower local politicians to exercise closer oversight over the bureaucracy through training and the dissemination of financial information. Lowered oversight costs increase politicians’ monitoring effort and the quality of services, but only in areas where the political leadership is not aligned with the dominant party. In areas under ruling-party control, politicians fear uncovering mismanagement of funds. In contrast to scholars arguing that insulating bureaucrats allows them to do their jobs more effectively, these findings imply that increased political oversight can improve government responsiveness in settings with a modicum of party competition. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 116, No.4; Nov 2022: p.1443 - 1459 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2022-12 116, 4 |
| Key Words | Ugandan Government |