| ID | 188935 |
| Title Proper | Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Iftikhar Ali ; Ali, Iftikhar ; Sidhu, Jatswan S |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol. 57, No.7; Nov 2022: p.1357-1375 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Asian and African Studies 2022-09 57, 7 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Deterrence ; crisis stability ; Strategic Stability ; Stability–Instability Paradox |