| ID | 189429 |
| Title Proper | Defence without deterrence |
| Other Title Information | India’s strategy in the 1965 war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Tarapore, Arzan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why does combat success sometimes fail to produce a stable and durable post-war settlement? In the 1965 war, India successfully defended against a Pakistani invasion, but did not improve the long-term security of Kashmir or establish deterrence against Pakistan. I argue that, to deter rivals after war, states must couple battlefield success with credible signals of resolve, such as retaining captured territory or risking a wider war. In 1965, India used both denial and punishment strategies, but both failed to establish post-war deterrence because it judged the necessary signals of resolve to be too costly. |
| `In' analytical Note |
Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 46, No.1; Feb 2023: p.
150-179 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 46 No 1 |
| Key Words | 1965 war ; Deterrence ; Military Strategy ; India ; Pakistan ; Escalation |