| ID | 189957 |
| Title Proper | Who punishes leaders for lying about the use of force? evaluating the microfoundations of domestic deception costs |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Yarhi-Milo, Keren |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiting this behavior. Using a novel vignette-style survey experiment, we find strong support for our theory: despite widespread willingness to punish leaders who lie, individuals high in Machiavellianism and Self-Monitoring are far less willing to punish presidents for lying than their low-type peers, and in some cases do not punish at all. Using robustness checks and causal mediation analysis, we confirm that views regarding the moral acceptability of lying drive responses to presidential deception. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 67, No.4; Apr 2023: p.559-586 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 67 No 4 |
| Key Words | Use of force ; Interstate Conflict ; Domestic Politics ; Foreign Policy |