| ID | 190105 |
| Title Proper | North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy and deception |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Park, Hwee-Rhak |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article analyzes North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy. For this purpose, it applies Vipin Narang’s theory to North Korea and analyzes North Korea’s efforts to develop and strengthen its nuclear weapons on a strategic level. This study argues that North Korea’s deception operations were crucial to the ultimate success of its “strategic” nuclear buildup. This article found that North Korea initially employed a “hiding strategy,” but after its nuclear program was exposed, it managed to continue its nuclear program through deceptive agreements with the United States and eventually succeeded in developing nuclear weapons in 2013. Then, North Korea adopted a “sprinting strategy” and initiated deceptive denuclearization negotiations with the United States to prevent a military strike by the United States and gain the time necessary for its continuous nuclear buildup. China also allowed a “sheltered pursuit” through tolerance of North Korea’s nuclear armament and diplomatic assistance as well as various clandestine assistances. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 23, No.1; Mar 2023: p.126-147 |
| Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol: 23 No 1 |
| Key Words | North Korea ; Deception ; Denuclearization Negotiation ; North Korea Nuclear ; North Korea Denuclearization |