| ID | 190291 |
| Title Proper | How to Defend Taiwan |
| Other Title Information | Leading with Economic Warfare |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | O'Hanlon, Michael |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Should the United States commit to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese attack? Should Washington extend to Taiwan something like NATO’s Article V mutual-defense promise or America’s solemn vow in Article V of the US-Japan Treaty to protect Japan against foreign aggression? Unlike those other treaties, Washington no longer has treaty pledges or any other kind of formal status in its dealings with Taiwan and does not even recognize Taiwan as a country. For four decades, under a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” the United States has refused to tip its hand, declaring instead that any decision on whether to use military power in defense of Taiwan would depend upon how a conflict began. Such deliberate muddying of the deterrence waters has had an unredeeming legacy from Korea to Kuwait and beyond. For Taiwan, however, such a policy has enjoyed support for four decades. |
| `In' analytical Note | Washington Quarterly Vol. 44, No.4; Winter 2022: p.183-196 |
| Journal Source | Washington Quarterly Vol: 44 No 4 |