| ID | 190383 |
| Title Proper | China’s Bureaucratic Slack |
| Other Title Information | Material Inducements and Decision-Making Risks among Chinese Local Cadres |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Keng, Shu ; Chen, Wei ; Wei Chen, Shu Keng, and Siyi Zhang ; Zhang, Siyi |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In recent years, Party leaders have expressed concern about “bureaucratic slack,” or shirking, by local government officials. This article investigates the reasons for the emergence of bureaucratic slack in China’s political system. It verifies two popular hypotheses, namely, reduced material inducements and increased risk. Using a unique national survey of 1,789 local cadres, we confirm both hypotheses. Our survey also reveals differences across groups of local cadres. We find bureaucratic slack among lower-ranked cadres to be caused mainly by the lack of material inducements, while higher-ranked officials are more discouraged by increased risks. We conducted follow-up fieldwork to examine in greater depth why each cohort responded differently to the Xi administration’s administrative reforms and anticorruption drives. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Journal , No.89; Jan 2023: p.70-94 |
| Journal Source | China Journal No 89 |
| Key Words | China’s Bureaucratic Slack ; Material Inducements ; Chinese Local Cadres |