| ID | 190602 |
| Title Proper | Equitable reverse auctions supporting household energy investments |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Best, Rohan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A major challenge faced by policymakers has been determining appropriate subsidy amounts for household energy investments. This can result in inequitable support being either insufficient or excessive. Equitable reverse auctions offer a novel approach to address these issues. Households can bid an amount as a subsidy from the government that they require to go ahead with an energy investment. The lowest bids are successful in a reverse auction, allowing for cost-effective government support. The novel part is the pursuit of equity, as these auctions can occur separately for a pre-determined number of carefully chosen socio-economic groups. Equitable reverse auctions would lower inequality by design, relative to a common benchmark of equal subsidies, for a given government budget and environmental outcomes. Compared to a standard reverse auction, an equitable reverse auction will have greater equality by design but lower cost-effectiveness. However, the design of equitable reverse auctions is cost-effective within each socio-economic group. Non-additional subsidy spending would be reduced through reverse auctions. Equitable reverse auctions would be flexible to fit circumstances across countries, time, and technologies. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy Vol. 177, Jun 2023: p.113548 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy 2023-06 177 |
| Key Words | Equity ; Household ; Battery ; Solar ; Electric Vehicle ; Reverse Auction |