| ID | 191964 |
| Title Proper | Bureaucrats and Budgets in South Korea |
| Other Title Information | Evidence for Hometown Favoritism |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Jung, Hoyong |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article presents evidence that high-ranking public officials in the Ministry of Strategy and Finance in South Korea affect local budget allocation. Applying a regression model on a uniquely constructed panel dataset, I found that the growth rate of the per-capita National Subsidy, which is a subcomponent of the national budget susceptible to discretionary behaviors, increases approximately 7 percent in the hometowns of high-ranking bureaucrats. To validate these findings and address causality, I conducted a battery of auxiliary robustness checks, which yielded confirmatory results. This study also found that enhancing transparency in the budget allocation system can alleviate concerns about bureaucratic hometown favoritism, providing suggestive evidence of bureaucrats’ rent-seeking behaviors without government transparency. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 23, No.2; Jul 2023: p.205 - 239 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol: 23 No 2 |
| Key Words | South Korea ; Bureaucrats ; Budget Allocation ; hometown favoritism ; rent-seeking behavior |