| ID | 192048 |
| Title Proper | Conflict with Third-Party Intervention and Revenge |
| Other Title Information | a Game-Theoretic Exploration |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Munshi, Soumyanetra ; Mukherjee, Puja |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Most real-world conflicts are characterised by the presence of third-party interventions as well as prolonged and revengeful violent interactions between the conflicting parties. However, most of the conflict literature studies the impact of each of these forces – third-party intervention and revenge motivations – on the conflict, in isolation from each other. This paper attempts to fill in this gap and aims to explore the impact of these two forces acting in conjunction with each other on a conflict situation. In fact, we also endogenise the intervention decision of the third party and explore parametric restrictions under which a third party decides to intervene (either as an ally of one of the conflicting parties or as an ‘idealist’ aiming to reduce overall conflict levels) and its repercussions on associated conflict levels. We also present narrative evidences of some real-life conflicts that amply exhibit the two forces of third-party intervention and revenge.
Peace is the only battle worth waging. – Albert Camus |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 34, No.6; Oct 2023: p.767-790 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 34 No 6 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Third-Party Intervention ; Revenge ; Military Subsidy ; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium |