| ID | 192627 |
| Title Proper | Environmental Clientelism |
| Other Title Information | How Chinese Private Enterprises Lobby under Environmental Crackdowns |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Li, Jun ; Zhan, Jing Vivian ; Jing Vivian Zhan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | China's environmental crackdowns under Xi Jinping have led to a sweeping shutdown of private enterprises. To circumvent this, enterprises have developed different survival strategies including direct lobbying to government officials and indirect lobbying through business associations. Based on comparative case studies of environmental lobbying in Chinese cities, our research finds that larger enterprises, enjoying more economic leverage, tend to lobby directly using their own political connections to sway environmental enforcement. By contrast, smaller enterprises are excluded from these clientelist networks and have to lobby through business associations, the effectiveness of which hinges on the support of large enterprises. Therefore, we argue that although the Chinese government's increasingly stringent environmental policies have shrunk the lobbying (and living) space for private enterprises, the existence of environmental clientelism protects economically powerful and politically connected private enterprises but sacrifices the others in the implementation of environmental policies. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Quarterly Vol. 255; Sep 2023: p.679 - 696 |
| Journal Source | China Quarterly No 255 |
| Key Words | China ; Private enterprises ; Lobbying ; State–Business Relations ; implementation of environmental policies |