| ID | 193112 |
| Title Proper | Your Reputation Precedes You |
| Other Title Information | Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Clayton, Govinda ; Bara, Corinne |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How does the state’s behavior in negotiations with one non-state group influence the behavior of other non-state actors? We argue that the dynamics of different conflicts within the same country are interdependent, and that a state develops a reputation through its interactions with each conflict party. This reputation provides a valuable source of information that other groups use to judge the state’s cooperative intentions. When a state develops a reputation for cooperation, this increases the likelihood of (indirect) reciprocation from other groups. More specifically, we argue that when states enter into (and honor) a ceasefire with one rebel group, they demonstrate a credible reputation for cooperation. A credible reputation for cooperation, we posit, increases the likelihood that other conflict parties enter into ceasefires with the state, or that they de-escalate their military activities. We test our claims using the new civil conflict ceasefire dataset and find support for our argument. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 67, No.7-8; Aug-Sep 2023: p.1325-1349 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 67 No 7-8 |
| Key Words | Conflict Management ; Bargaining ; Reputation ; Conflict Dynamics ; Ceasefires ; Civil War |