| ID | 193172 |
| Title Proper | Systemic effects of economic interdependence and the militarisation of diplomacy |
| Other Title Information | 1914 and beyond |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Levy, Jack S ; Mulligan, William |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Empirical research generally supports the dyadic-level trade-promotes-peace hypothesis, while demonstrating that the relationship is weaker, more complex, and more conditional than liberal theory suggests. We shift to the system level and examine a neglected path to conflict in economically interdependent systems. In the great power competition for support among smaller states, a great power at a competitive disadvantage in economic instruments of influence may be incentivised to adopt more militarised strategies. We illustrate our argument with case studies of Austro-Hungarian and Russian influence strategies before the First World War and of Prussian strategies among German states before the Franco-Prussian War. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 46, No.5; Oct 2023: p.894-920 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 46 No 5 |
| Key Words | Militarisation ; First World War ; Economic Interdependence ; Economic Coercion ; Great Power Competition |