| ID | 193213 |
| Title Proper | Campaign-style Personnel Management |
| Other Title Information | Task Responsiveness and Selective Delocalization during China's Anti-corruption Crackdown, 2013–2020 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Feng Tang ; Tang, Feng ; Qian, Jingyuan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The anti-corruption campaign launched by General Secretary Xi Jinping has been one of the most far-reaching bureaucratic overhauls in modern Chinese history. How has Xi's crackdown on corruption shaped bureaucratic selection at the sub-provincial level? In this paper, we find that the purge has influenced how local ties are weighed in the appointment of prefecture city leaders. While it is common for provincial Party chiefs to appoint locally embedded officials to govern localities without high-profile corruption cases, they tend to appoint outside officials without local experience and connections to manage cities whose ex-leaders have recently been prosecuted for corruption. We argue that the provincial leaders’ objective of installing non-local officials is to exert hierarchical control and oversight in localities affected by corruption. Using an original dataset of all Party secretaries from China's 287 prefecture-level cities between 2013 and 2020, we find a significant divergence in the local embeddedness of officials who are appointed to replace corrupt ex-leaders and the embeddedness of those who fill the vacancies of transferred or retired predecessors. Our study sheds light on how Xi's anti-corruption campaign has reshaped the central–local relations and the logic of political control in China. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Quarterly Vol. 256 ; Dec 2023: p.919 - 938 |
| Journal Source | China Quarterly No 256 |
| Key Words | Xi Jinping ; Political Selection ; Central-local Relations ; Cadre Management ; Anti-Corruption Campaign |