| Summary/Abstract |
Environmental governance reform—especially in the minerals sector—has featured prominently in Sierra Leone's peacebuilding agenda. While reform has enhanced environmental governance capacity in ways that foster peace, it has also exacerbated conflict over the redistribution of extractive rights. This article examines one such conflict over tantalite in northern Sierra Leone. In the chiefdom of Sella Limba, violence erupted as local landowners and a multinational company utilized institutional hybridity—or the blending of informal–indigenous institutions with liberal reforms—to construct competing claims over mineral rights. The resulting uncertainty over the extractive ‘rules of the game’ accelerated conflict as stakeholders attempted to (re)negotiate the distributional consequences of institutional change in real time. International and national actors ultimately rejected hybrid institutional arrangements on the grounds that they distorted post-conflict reforms and undermined peace. Drawing on in-depth fieldwork, I retrace the conflict to provide an alternative perspective. I contend that institutional hybridity served as a necessary component of, rather than barrier to, peacebuilding because it 1) opened space for diverse political participation in post-conflict environmental governance and 2) promoted greater political accountability and integration. These outcomes have been theorized as ways in which environmental reform can facilitate post-conflict peace. This argument aims to advance environmental peacebuilding theory by examining the conditions under which environmental governance reform contributes to post-conflict peacebuilding.
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