| Summary/Abstract |
How do small powers choose the version of an international order to subscribe to? What factors are at play when a state subscribes to the rules-based order or decides to abandon those commitments and shift to an alternative version of order? The argument put forth in this article is that this choice is a function of domestic dynamics and the expected foreign policy gains of the sitting leader. In questioning the automaticity of a small power's choice, the article makes two important contributions. At the conceptual level, it supports the idea that orders persist because of the mutually constitutive actions of great and small powers. It lends credence to the claim of intersubjectivity in international relations and emphasizes that agency is anchored in relations between states. At the policy level, the article finds that while the Philippines seems to automatically subscribe to the United States-led order, pockets of resistance are a function of a colonial past that lingers to this day, which became fertile ground for the country's pivot to China during the Duterte administration. The article closes by highlighting that alliances risk their cohesion and effectiveness without coordinated maintenance, so policy lessons on alliance management are necessary to improve collective security arrangements.
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