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1 |
ID:
191824
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Summary/Abstract |
The centrepiece of the AUKUS defence pact agreed between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021 was a commitment to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. This made redundant an earlier $90 billion deal Australia had entered into with France to deliver conventionally powered submarines. Australia’s decision to renege on the French deal, as well as the revelation that three of France’s key partners had negotiated AUKUS in secret, triggered a furious French diplomatic response. In this commentary, we explore the ramifications of this episode for future Australia-France relations. We begin by documenting the immediate diplomatic fallout of the AUKUS announcement and tracing how the dispute became personalised between Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and French President Emmanuel Macron. We then move to consider how the episode reveals the divergent approaches Australia and France are taking in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, we highlight three reasons why this episode represents a theoretically valuable case study for scholars interested in the roles of trust and leadership in global politics, given it features the breakdown of interpersonal trust between leaders of friendly states.
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2 |
ID:
191827
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Summary/Abstract |
The AUKUS agreement to facilitate Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines has been described by its critics as a ‘bet' on the U.S. This bet entails serious risks for Australia. These risks include uncertainty around construction of the submarines; uncertainty around the U.S.'s long-term commitment to the region; and uncertainty about the future political trajectory of the U.S. These risks are compounded by the sovereignty-constraining implications of AUKUS. The reliance on U.S. technical expertise, and the demands of military interoperability, will bind Australian defence policy more closely to the U.S. than ever. Hence, AUKUS is a deal that demands close scrutiny. This article contributes to such scrutiny, exploring the risks associated with this bet on the U.S. In particular, it examines the ‘America’ that Australian governments expressly want – a liberal internationalist America with a strong commitment to democracy – and then contrasts this with the America that Australia does not want but may well get: an illiberal America that is increasingly anti-democratic at home and crudely transactional, protectionist and undiplomatic abroad. The obvious problem with this approach, we argue, is that Australia does not get to choose the presidential administration in the U.S. over the next twenty to forty years.
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3 |
ID:
191826
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Summary/Abstract |
Climate change can undermine human, national and planetary security in various ways. While scholars harve explored the human security implications of climate change and climate security discourses in Australia, systematic scientific assessments of climate change and national security are scarce. I address this knowledge gap by analysing whether climate change impacts the national security of Australia before 2050, focussing particularly on climate-related threats within Australia and on countries of high strategic importance for Australia. The results indicate that climate change will very likely undermine Australia’s national security by disrupting critical infrastructure, by challenging the capacity of the defence force, by increasing the risk of domestic political instability in Australia’s immediate region, by reducing the capabilities of partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and by interrupting important supply chains. These impacts will matter most if several large-scale disasters co-occur or if Australia becomes involved in a major international conflict. By contrast, international wars, large-scale migration, and adverse impacts on key international partners are only minor climate-related risks.
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4 |
ID:
191828
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Summary/Abstract |
Robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) are amongst a plethora of new and emerging technologies states are seeking to develop and use to gain military advantage in an environment of intensifying strategic competition. Australia is a key player when it comes to autonomous systems, with trusted autonomous systems (TAS) being earmarked as a priority area. RAS have taken an increasingly prevalent place in Australian research, discourse, military thinking, and defence industry. How Australia thinks about these technologies reveals important insights into their broader defence and strategic outlook, including their understanding of how the character of warfare is changing, and their approach to alliances and partnerships. In this article, I will trace how TAS became a priority area for defence in Australia, and provide a stocktake of the key developments in RAS which have taken place since 2016. This will include key actors, funding, discourses, and technologies. Taking stock of RAS in Australia reveals several key themes which stand out: the centrality of the concept of control, trust, ethics, interoperability, keeping ahead of adversaries, reducing danger to defence personnel, and developing systems which are cheap, small, and single-use.
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5 |
ID:
191823
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Summary/Abstract |
In flagrant violation of international law, Russia has invaded Ukraine. It invokes a right to intervene on humanitarian and security grounds despite the necessary pre-conditions, including UN Security Council endorsement, being absent. In Myanmar, the February Citation2021 military coup has ushered in a new era of serious repression of citizens, violent conflict and human rights violations. ASEAN’s 2021 five-point consensus to end the violence and promote conciliation has been largely ignored. These are but two of a number of current global threats which defy unilateral resolution and demand multilateral responses. Others are the looming disasters provoked by climate change; the ongoing Covid pandemic; conflict and the threat of conflict from Syria and Yemen to the South China Sea; the return of repressive Taliban rule in Afghanistan; ferocious civil war in Ethiopia; historically high refugee displacement; and mass migratory movements.
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6 |
ID:
191825
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Summary/Abstract |
After nearly a decade of policy inaction by the Abbott/Turnbull/Morrison Coalition governments, the election of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government has ushered in expectations of a sea-change in Australian climate policy, one that might allow the country to finally emerge as a global leader on the issue. Yet while years of inaction have left some relatively easy victories for the new government to rack up, the change of leadership and rhetoric obscures some key continuities in the Albanese government’s approach that need to be foregrounded and critiqued by domestic and international audiences alike. In this brief commentary, we consider what the new Labor government might mean for Australian climate action over the coming years. We focus, in particular, on the role that fossil fuel exports will continue to play in overwhelming any emissions cuts achieved domestically, and underscore the need for a much broader and more ambitious national climate strategy designed to wean the country off its reliance on coal and gas revenues.
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7 |
ID:
191829
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Summary/Abstract |
Australia’s efforts to pursue public diplomacy through a government-funded international television service have been sporadic and ineffectual. The reasons for failure lie in the way such efforts have been pawns in other political conflicts and relationships – conflicts between Coalition governments and the ABC; conflicts between Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard that dominated the Labor government from 2010 onwards; and the wish of key players in both major parties to please Rupert Murdoch and News Corp. The Abbott Government’s 2014 axing of the ten-year contract with Australian Television slashed Australia’s international broadcasting capacity. Domestic agendas have repeatedly trumped what should be a tool of international policy.
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