| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Sino-Indian border disputes in the post-Cold War period. There has been an increased frequency of Chinese military coercion in the Sino-Indian border disputes since 2006. This trend contrasts with Chinese coercion in the South China Sea in the post-2007 period, which tends to be non-militarized. Why does China prefer to use military coercion regarding Sino-Indian border disputes? This article argues that the geopolitical backlash cost for China to use military coercion against India has been low since the 1990s, and China, therefore, has consistently used militarized coercive tools. In contrast, the high geopolitical backlash cost pertaining to South China Sea disputes led China to utilize non-military coercion post-2007. This article implications for theorizing China’s choices of coercive tools and its India policy.
|