Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
001890
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Publication |
Boston, Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000.
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Description |
xx, 331p.
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Standard Number |
1577597518
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
042811 | 327/CUS 042811 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
006622
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Publication |
Washington, US Govternment Printing Office, 1995.
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Description |
119p.
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Contents |
Chairman: Jesse Helms
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Standard Number |
0160520932
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
038379 | R 355.8251190947/US 038379 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
059406
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4 |
ID:
052111
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5 |
ID:
008034
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Publication |
Oct 1995.
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Description |
343-348
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6 |
ID:
009638
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Publication |
Jan 1996.
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Description |
40-44
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7 |
ID:
077343
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
The essay examines the networks that facilitate the transport of nuclear materials from the source to their possible purchasers. Analyzing the role of prisons in criminal operations, the interaction of criminals and terrorists, and the character of new organized crime groups, the author concludes that some of the most serious nuclear smuggling is not random or opportunistic. Rather, the most serious trafficking is rarely detected because it is run by professionals whose well established smuggling networks, facilitated by corruption, have the capacity to move significant quantities of diverse contraband without apprehension. Technical solutions to address this problem are not sufficient because detectors cannot identify well guarded HEU. Rather, much more attention needs to be paid to the crime and terror networks that can facilitate this trade
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8 |
ID:
144285
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Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the paradox of trust in the largest nuclear smuggling operation involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) discussed in open source literature. In the first effort to understand the type, extent, and role of trust in nuclear smuggling enterprises, it draws from literature on trust development in legitimate businesses as well as criminal enterprises. Observed behavioral patterns in this case challenge traditional notions of the internal dynamics of temporary groups engaged in nuclear smuggling and operational realities of such activities. The article seeks to explain why individuals agree (and continue) to operate in this high-risk environment, unbound by close personal ties, without any effort to verify the background, motives, or qualifications of the fellow conspirators. It offers ways to advance current nonproliferation efforts in non-state actor interdiction by exploiting the environment of shallow trust in temporary groups.
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9 |
ID:
060784
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10 |
ID:
083363
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