| Summary/Abstract |
This article deals with the observation of the activities of West Germans in the Middle East by the West German intelligence organizations Org. Gehlen (under US tutelage until 1956) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst/ BND (under German Federal jurisdiction thereafter) between the late 1940s and late 1960s. It is largely based on hitherto unpublished primary sources from the BND archive, to which the author had access as member of the officially appointed Independent Commission of Historians for the History of the BND (‘Unabhängige Historikerkommission’ or UHK). It argues that the Org. Gehlen/ the BND performed well. It furnished its employers with accurate information and insightful interpretations in the complicated field of Middle Eastern politics in the first quarter century after de-colonization. It also demonstrates how the Federal Government did not necessarily follow the BND’s recommendations, particularly with regard to its policy towards Israel. In this aspect the BND serves as an example of the strengths and weaknesses of intelligence services per se.
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