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| 1 |
ID:
192119
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| Summary/Abstract |
The shidu problem as an unexpected consequence of the historical one-child policy has now become the new work focus of Chinese family planning officials. Given that the unresolvable dispute over state support has caused shidu activists’ continuous petitioning of governments, local family planning agents take the whole shidu group as a major instability factor while paying undue attention to them due to the strong impact of stability maintenance on their political career. Subsequently, the overemphasis on social stability and shidu families has led to alienation as reflected in the rising economic and social cost for the task. Ultimately, the shidu problem not only disrupts the central government’s plan to address population aging, but also will constrain the development of China’s future population policy.
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| 2 |
ID:
192120
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During the 2020 Two Sessions of Chinese Government, national representatives debated ‘single women’s’ reproductive rights (SWRR), a cause spearheaded by a coalition of queer feminist activists and lawyers in China. In light of state retaliation against feminist and LGBTQ movements since 2015, why have feminist activists, LGBTQ activists, and legal activists been able to coalesce around SWRR? My analysis shows a differential coalescing process, in which Chinese queer feminist activists have driven the coalition to constantly re-center queer women’s lived reality. I argue that these activists’ movements between and around different dominant strategies for challenging China’s state-family project and their commitment to rallying others who may differ in their approach have made SWRR a site around which to coalesce in post-2015 Chinese civil society.
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| 3 |
ID:
192124
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This study examines how power centralization at the provincial level affects the allocation of fiscal expenditures in China. The authors employ a quasi-natural experimental setting formed by a regulation established in 2002 stating that, in general, provincial Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretaries should be recommended as candidates for chairmen of the Provincial People’s Congress (PPC). An empirical analysis of provincial panel data finds that Party secretaries concurrently serving as PPC chairmen not only inflates the size of local public expenditures, but also limits fiscal expenditures supporting social welfare and livelihood programs due to a tendency among local leaders to invest more in economic programs that could generate short-term economic growth. Furthermore, power centralization and constrained congressional power could reduce the efficiency of local public expenditures.
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| 4 |
ID:
192116
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| Summary/Abstract |
Beijing has played a long game on Taiwan for more than seventy years. Starting with Mao Zedong’s aborted aspiration of military liberation in 1949, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao focused on peaceful unification although they never renounced the use of force. With the rhetoric of striving for peaceful unification, Xi Jinping has relied more on brinkmanship to press Taiwan to accept his hardened terms of unification. Xi has made clear that the Taiwan question is China’s core national interest and essentially non-negotiable, important enough to go to war if pushed. China as a ‘divided nation’ cannot sit well with Xi’s China Dream, the catch-all term for Xi’s ambition for great-power status. Riding on the nationalist currents he whipped up, Xi will end the long game according to his timetable, or sooner if the brinkmanship fails and the red lines crossed, whether China is ready or not.
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| 5 |
ID:
192122
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This article contributes to the ongoing debate over China’s behaviour in the multilateral trading system established by the World Trade Organization (WTO). It offers a systemic review of all completed WTO disputes against China in the past two decades and a critical analysis of four political factors embedded in China’s impressive record of compliance. In doing so, it develops an analytical framework for future studies on China’s approaches to WTO compliance and its interaction with international trade rules more broadly. While China’s trade policy has become more sensitive to the changing external environment, this framework will remain highly relevant to studies of China’s behaviour on trade and other economic matters and ways to engage with the emerging global superpower in the years ahead.
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| 6 |
ID:
192126
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s urban community is an important venue to examine the function of political discourse. Drawing on the theory of strategic action field, this article regards community as a field where officials act as incumbents, citizens as challengers, and the political discourse as an internal governance unit. The empirical data from multiple cities demonstrates that political discourses have facilitated the incumbents with several pragmatic utilities such as assuring the state’s dominance, mobilizing citizens’ participation, and disciplining residents’ regular behaviors. Meanwhile, these discourses have met the problem of ideological fatigue. Local officials’ hypocritical identification and citizens’ disguised conformity disenable the Party-state to win recognition from both citizens and officials. The findings of this article enrich the current study of political discourse with a new perspective.
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| 7 |
ID:
192125
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| 8 |
ID:
192118
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Amid U.S.-led efforts to “internationalize and multilateralize” support for Taiwan in response to mounting pressure from China, the 2021 U.S.-South Korea presidential statement’s unprecedented reference to “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” made global headlines. This study analyzes contemporary Korea-Taiwan relations in historic and comparative perspective, focusing especially on Seoul’s official 1992 position on “One China” and its implications for Korea’s Taiwan policy. It demonstrates that Seoul has never recognized Beijing’s self-defined “One China principle” concerning its essential claim of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Comparative analysis of Korea’s position and subsequent policies with the U.S.’, Japan’s, and others’ further reveals significant (potential) flexibility in Korea’s approach to Taiwan. The relatively distant state of Korea-Taiwan relations today is the collective political choice of Korea’s democratically-elected leaders—not the legacy of some (non-existent) putative commitment made to Beijing 30 years ago.
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| 9 |
ID:
192121
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the growing challenges brought by Artificial Intelligence (AI)’s rapid development, multiple global AI governance initiatives have been developed to set up AI norms and standards. With China’s open ambition to be an AI superpower in 2030, China is keen to play a leadership role in nascent global AI governance regimes. This article argues that China’s search for AI leadership is driven by not only domestic regulatory needs but also the desire to gain norm and agenda setting power. China’s leadership ambition in global AI governance lies in the wider context of its aspiration to shift from a norm-taker towards a norm-shaper, if not maker. Despite considerable efforts taken so far, however, this article suggests that China is facing enormous challenges to realize its leadership ambition. The current geopolitical landscapes have allowed China limited room in nascent global AI governance regimes to demonstrate its leadership credentials. It remains to be seen how China’s role may evolve with the development of global AI governance architecture.
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| 10 |
ID:
192123
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nationalist narratives and geopolitical reality have played an opposite role in shaping China’s engagement with the Arctic, with the former pushing it forward while the latter pushing it back. Specifically, Chinese nationalist narratives on strong feelings of love for and pride in the Chinese nation not only initiated but also facilitated China’s engagement with the Arctic. Moreover, the ‘China Dream’, an official narrative put forward by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, has driven the country to undertake proactive measures to engage with the Arctic, among others, including self-ascribing China as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ and self-designating the ‘Polar Silk Road’. In stark contrast, however, the geopolitical reality featured by Arctic countries’ policies to push back China’s activities in this region has stymied its ambition to attain great power status in the Arctic.
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| 11 |
ID:
192117
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on a nine-city cell phone survey in 2019, this paper systematically examines which groups showed stronger support for armed unification with Taiwan and what factors and mechanisms might contribute to their support. The bivariate analysis shows the politically, economically, and socially privileged groups and those with stronger national pride and more understanding of Taiwan were more pro-armed unification, while residents of the two coastal cities, Xiamen and Guangzhou, were less supportive. Further analysis indicates education and unfavorable view of the Taiwanese government were the two most powerful factors contributing to the support. Possible contributing mechanisms might include both top-down mechanisms, such as political indoctrination and propaganda, and bottom-up ones, such as the respondents’ interest and identity considerations influenced by their city’s proximity to Taiwan.
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