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| 1 |
ID:
192107
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s 40 million party and state cadres all matriculate through an elaborate system set of more than 7000 institutions for mid-career cadre training. These mid-career training institutions have long been an integral part of the Chinese party-state but have become even more important during Xi Jinping’s tenure. Drawing on unique Chinese published sources and interviews, the article examines the history and current organization of the five separate institutional systems involved in civilian cadre training, the evolving reforms in them, and their role in sustaining CCP rule. These training school systems in China are becoming more rather than less important for these reasons. Thus, the entire training system nationwide needs to be better understood by scholars and analysts of the Chinese political system.
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| 2 |
ID:
192109
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s external propaganda, or waixuan, is organized by two separate bureaucratic systems – the ‘propaganda system’ and the ‘foreign affairs system.’ This article examines waixuan’s changing strategies and the bureaucratic structure’s adjustments. It argues that since 2012, waixuan has moved on from its previous emphasis on traditional culture in the Jiang and Hu periods to promoting China’s development model. The Foreign Ministry bears the pressure to project the image of a great power, making waixuan increasingly ideology-oriented and inflexible. Meanwhile, the great power narrative provides both opportunities and pressure for the propaganda system to use waixuan to feed nationalism among domestic audiences, even though it has been cautious about nationalist mobilization. Such nationalism, in turn, further ideologizes waixuan, making it difficult to attract foreign audiences.
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| 3 |
ID:
192113
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper aims to discuss China’s behavior in the developing world through the lens of the domestic model of governance. It does so by seeking analogies between three forms of Beijing’s political approaches in domestic affairs: generating enthusiasm through slogan politics and promised incentives, informal networks, and coordinated development in China-led multilateralism with Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. By discussing the domestic-foreign policy nexus, the paper introduces the concept of China’s vertical multilateralism. Finally, by broaching a new theoretical understanding, the paper decodes China’s behavior in the regions mentioned above and provides an alternative model for understanding China’s foreign policy in the developing world.
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| 4 |
ID:
192108
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Even as many argue that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has become increasingly professionalized, reports of PLA deserters are common. This article investigates such refusals to serve between 2009 and 2018, using an original dataset of 236 publicly reported cases. It demonstrates that mainland reports about desertion are restricted, portraying the behavior as occurring among soldiers who are young, unable to endure hardship, and subject to severe and varied punishments. Analysis of this data shows that refusals to serve are more common in China’s military than public reports indicate, and that China’s leaders are concerned about the phenomenon, though they offer no indication the PLA as a whole would disobey civilian leadership. These findings shed light on China’s civil-military relations, central-local relations, and foreign policy.
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| 5 |
ID:
192112
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whilst China’s increasing foreign aid in education to Africa, its soft power remains insufficient. ‘Telling China’s story well’ attributes the lack of soft power to inadequate communication. This article argues that the ‘story’ rather than ‘telling’ matters. It reveals that the education-for-economic development paradigm adopted by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Education’s reluctance toward Africa jointly shape China’s ineffective practice in the international discourse. Institutional changes since 2018 can hardly alter this bureaucratic divide as the imbalanced capacity of China’s economy and education remains. This article contributes to bureaucratic politics in foreign policymaking by identifying ministerial influences subject to their relevance to foreign policy rather than their occupancy of resources in the issue area.
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| 6 |
ID:
192110
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s meteoric economic rise has precipitated a debate about its growing profile in Europe through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In this context, for some observers Greece serves as an illustration of how China is also translating its economic power into actual political influence over small European states to Brussels’ disadvantage. This article challenges such simplistic and state-centric views by considering the role of contingent and domestic factors and the wider strategic environment in which Sino-Greek relations have unfolded. It also highlights the agency of influential actors at the more micro-level of analysis. It argues that although China has achieved some limited political gains, the relationship remains mainly economics-driven at a time when Greece is strengthening strategic ties with its traditional allies.
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| 7 |
ID:
192114
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This study investigates how the different political opportunity structures (POS) are related to NGO mobilization in two Chinese cities, Guangzhou and Hangzhou. Based on 48 interviews from 2016–2019, the study finds that variance in NGO mobilization is related to differences such as rules for NGO registration, more or less open-minded local leaders, and a relatively more independent media. NGO governance in Hangzhou is characterized as coopted participation. A few NGOs are allowed some influence in policy making, but in order to be allowed to mobilize, NGOs must accept a certain degree of cooptation. NGO governance in Guangzhou is characterized as constrained autonomy as the government plays a less active role in mobilizing NGOs, and more initiative for policy influence comes from the NGOs themselves.
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| 8 |
ID:
192106
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 2014 and 2019, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders conducted an internal debate over whether to continue prioritizing economic development as the Party’s most important policy priority or whether to consider security equally as important. The debate has concluded as of 2020, and the CCP has embraced a new guiding principle that elevates security alongside development as a key policy focus. The CCP appears to have determined it can assert itself on a broad range of issues beyond those permitted by the ‘development-first’ approach it maintained since 2002, even at cost to economic growth. Following its new policy determination, the Chinese government’s behavior will be harder to shape using only tools that primarily threaten Chinese economic performance.
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| 9 |
ID:
192115
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how resources were allocated from the central government to rural households through China’s targeted poverty alleviation program. The fieldwork in different regions from 2015 to 2019 revealed that local social rules and structures distorted the allocation of anti-poverty resources. In ‘solidarity’ villages, resources targeted disadvantaged groups recognized by local but not official rules. In ‘individualized’ villages without strong local rules, resources were given to ‘troublemakers.’ In ‘factional’ villages, a scramble for resources occurred. The anti-poverty resources activated the rural social structures and rules, which finally diversified the outcomes of resource flows. This study suggests that a deep understanding of local traditions is needed in policy design and implementation to tackle the existing social rules and achieve the original policy target.
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| 10 |
ID:
192111
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article studies contemporary Chinese engagement with Thailand in the context of migration. It argues the past of Chinese migration to Thailand shapes how the contemporary bilateral relations is perceived. In the context of Chinese engagement with Thailand, we should keep in mind the long history of Chinese migration and at times hostile policies the Thai government implemented to deal with such large numbers of migrants. Anti-China rhetoric thus has historical roots in the Chinese migration experience in Thailand, and one can argue that this history still frames some of the explicit or implicit Sinophobia within contemporary Thai society. Such historical legacies and the peculiar status of the Sino-Thai thus have created a varied reaction towards the recent Chinese presence in Thailand.
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