| Summary/Abstract |
A gray zone conflict that emerged after the Russian annexation of Crimea was an element of the Russian strategy of establishing and consolidating a new and more favourable internationally recognized maritime order in the Black Sea, Kerch Strait, and the Sea of Azov. Empirical data shows that Russian superiority over Ukraine and inferiority vis-a-vis the West shaped a double asymmetry of its tactics of projecting power against Ukraine while avoiding confrontation with the West. Eventually, Moscow reached a point where the gray zone tactics could not secure its objectives. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 signalled the exhausting coercive potential of a gray zone conflict. Although, despite of transition to conventional warfare, we found continuity of ‘gray zone’ tactics of double asymmetry and denying responsibility in the Russian playbook. Hence, a possible de-escalation of the Russia – Ukraine war may likely return to a gray zone conflict.
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