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| 1 |
ID:
192679
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 1945 to 1961, the United States spent over a billion dollars attempting to develop an airplane powered by a nuclear reactor. Such an aircraft seemingly offered nearly limitless performance capabilities, especially in terms of range, but numerous technical problems existed from the outset. The plane would have required an overly hefty radiation shield, scientific knowledge of the involved materials was insufficient, and any plane crash would create a legitimate nuclear disaster. This article examines the nuclear plane project and what it reveals about the application (or lack thereof) of scientific knowledge by policymakers charged with developing nuclear technologies. Even though scientists and engineers were clear about the attendant technical issues, policymakers focused on the potentiality of any nuclear airplane to the detriment of the project’s development and its ultimate demise.
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| 2 |
ID:
192680
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| Summary/Abstract |
In March 1946, President Truman decided to second roughly an eighth of all U.S. military forces to the United Nations. The New York Times declared the same month that the international police force initially proposed by U.S. planners would number “perhaps 2,000,000 men” and that it would “enforce the rules and regulations for world order.” This article explores American visions of the postwar order through the lens of the UN military project. In particular, it analyzes how the UN military project played a major role in the American reassessment of Soviet intentions, and with it, America’s global military strategy.
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| 3 |
ID:
192674
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the diffusion of military technology in Europe, North Africa, and Western Asia from the fourth to first centuries BCE. Arms and armor initially associated with Celtic peoples spread across the Mediterranean and beyond, a process hastened by the adoption of the panoply by the Romans in the century prior to their explosive conquests. This case study in the “globalization” of military technology in the pre-modern world highlights the agency and influence of groups commonly considered subaltern in the geopolitical history of the Mediterranean and its continental environs.
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| 4 |
ID:
192675
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historians have argued that Britain lost its early lead in developing mechanized formations in the interwar period due to financial pressures, inter-arm rivalry, poor tank design, and the misjudgments of tank enthusiasts. A systematic examination of armor doctrine, however, demonstrates that British approaches were coherent and innovative until 1935. Progress was derailed by the suppression of the “Tank Training” (1935) manual and the decision to mechanize the cavalry rather than expand the Royal Tank Corps. Coordination between manuals of arms of service and the field service regulations was abandoned, moreover, in favor of multiple training pamphlets. The result was the “Great Doctrine Disaster” caused by fallacious assumptions about tank design, tactics, and the future battlefield.
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| 5 |
ID:
192677
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite popular images that depict World War II paratroopers in idealized terms, the U.S. Army’s creation of these units unleashed a culture of masculinity predicated on aggressive elitism with significant side effects on the battlefield. This article examines American efforts to create airborne units in World War II and the concomitant effects on these units’ treatment of prisoners and sexual violence. The article discusses the difficulty of using fragmentary and inconclusive sources in reconstructing the dark side of warfare. It also offers a reconsideration of popular memory by restoring the harsh reality of war to narratives of American involvement in World War II and the paratroopers.
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| 6 |
ID:
192676
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Japan attacked European and U.S. possessions in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, the Australian government had on order more combat-ready operational aircraft from American firms than from Australian and British industries combined. The U.S. was thus critical to the equipping and expansion of the Royal Australian Air Force. This article demonstrates that the framework of imperial defense provided a means by which the Australian government sought to secure American supply, although pressures on U.S. industry ultimately delayed the Australia air force's modernization and expansion program in 1940–1941. The war with Japan nonetheless created the potential for a more direct Australian-American relationship.
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| 7 |
ID:
192678
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| Summary/Abstract |
Studies of the Allies’ grand strategy for the defeat of Japan in Southeast Asia usually focus on the discussions over Burma. This article examines the roles envisioned for the Bay of Bengal. It argues that operations within and based on the Bay of Bengal formed the basis of Allied strategy in Southeast Asia, but plans quickly diverged. The U.S. and China pushed for amphibious operations as part of the broader Burma campaign. Britain, however, wanted to use the Bay of Bengal as a springboard for operations into broader Southeast Asia. No party got what it wanted. Scrutinizing these strategic developments, however, provides a clearer understanding of the evolution of Southeast Asia’s place in the Allies’ grand strategy.
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