| Summary/Abstract |
The interplay of several international, regional, and local factors poses daunting challenges for deterrence stability in South Asia. The emerging revolution in the military affairs compounded with prolonged crises vis-à-vis the absence of any conflict resolution mechanism between India and Pakistan; the nuclear deterrence is budding a fragile relationship between the two nuclear-armed pugnacious belligerents of South Asia. The Indian aspirations to accumulate maximum power based on its strategic partnerships with the technologically advanced countries in the world are characterized by the classic Indian strategic thinking to establish its leadership in the region. At the same time, Pakistan’s reliance on China in its quests for acquiring military hardware required for the deterrence equation seemingly remains insatiable within the framework of the stability–instability paradox. Without a holistic analysis of the political and strategic challenges, casus belli of the crises, and nuclear command and control systems dynamics between the two, it would amount to a petitio principii to draw theoretical assumptions. Therefore, this study attempts to comprehensively explain the phenomena by analyzing the challenges of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia at different levels.
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