| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the reasons for the rise of the Taliban and the onset of the insurgency in Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S. invasion, using counterfactual and path dependence analysis to bolster its arguments. We argue that the U.S. decision to de-Talibanize was a critical juncture, after which the rise of insurgency was far harder to prevent. The total rejection of the Taliban translated into the under-representation of Pashtuns in the Afghan government, delivering power to ethnic minorities at their expense. De-Talibanization led the United States to support strongmen to hunt the Taliban, but they were predatory, creating grievances that the Taliban exploited to recruit. Finally, de-Talibanization led many Taliban to flee to Pakistan, pushing them into the country most opposed to Afghanistan new political order. The lessons of the U.S. experience in Afghanistan suggest the necessity of a strategy for managing defeated enemies after an initial military victory.
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