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1 |
ID:
193578
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Summary/Abstract |
Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in India has had its share of crests and troughs.Footnote1 The movement saw a renewed upward trajectory from 2004 when two major insurgent groups united under a single banner of the Maoist party.Footnote2 In the last decade or so, the insurgency has exhibited a declining trend.Footnote3 26 April 2023 however was an eventful date in so far as LWE in India was concerned. Nonetheless, the event was perhaps no surprise considering the ever predictable and standard modus operandi implemented by India’s Maoist extremists.Footnote4 On 26 April, ten police officials and a driver were assassinated in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district, as the Maoists ambushed them through an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).Footnote5
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2 |
ID:
193573
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Summary/Abstract |
In response to China’s phenomenal rise in the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies have institutionalized the QUAD. This article seeks to critique the novel construct of ‘Harmonious Realism’ and argues that the Chinese strategy for an Indo-Pacific regional order is paradoxical in nature. This paradox entails dichotomy between China’s rhetoric and practices in its institutional, strategic and economic aspects which can be empirically corroborated by the way China relates to ASEAN, its effort to seek an alternate model of security, and ensure economic interconnectivity through the BRI—all of which is counter-intuitive to China’s rhetoric of peaceful co-existence.
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3 |
ID:
193574
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Summary/Abstract |
The drone is the latest entrant in the ever-volatile India-Pakistan cross-border terrorism imbroglio. According to media reports, the use of the drones to send payloads, weapons, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has substantially increased in the last two years. This technology has been a boon for the terrorist outfits based in Pakistan which are using Chinese drones to drop payloads and plan terrorist attacks in Indian cities. This article discusses how the drone is emerging as a new frontier of warfare; drone development in India and Pakistan; emerging instances of cross-border terrorism via drones; security implications therein and also possible solutions which lie ahead.
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4 |
ID:
193576
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Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of the Russia—Ukraine war that began in February 2022, Russia faced an barrage of tough international sanctions. Meanwhile, the United States and Europe attempted to pressure China to assume a more responsible position in the international armed conflict. The United States-led political coalition attempted to politico-diplomatically diminish Russia’s presence in the Global South by pushing governments in developing countries to take sides, while capitals outside the Global North made significant efforts to avoid chain ganging on either side, including, inter alia, voting to condemn Russia in the United Nations General Assembly.
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5 |
ID:
193572
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Summary/Abstract |
As the Russia-Ukraine war enters a phase of attrition, Moscow is increasingly turning to the Global South for diplomatic support and ways to replenish its depleted resources. Likewise, given Pakistan’s grave economic situation and food crisis, the country is anxiously turning to Russia with open arms. This article examines the upward trajectory of relations between Moscow and Islamabad and analyses its implications for India. The article contends that although bilateral relations between Russia and Pakistan have their own dynamics, this confluence of interests takes on a completely new dimension when aligned with China. The war in Ukraine and the fluid global order have certainly complicated the geopolitical calculus in South Asia, and consequent reshuffling of positions may eventually push New Delhi away from Moscow.
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6 |
ID:
193575
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Summary/Abstract |
The NPT placed two non-proliferation requirements on the NNWS. Article II expects the NNWS not to indulge in any activity related to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III(1) requires the NNWS to accept nuclear safeguards to be implemented by IAEA. Recently, the IAEA has proposed State-Level Concept (SLC) for verifying the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state within the provisions of the CSA. It is argued in the article how this concept will enable the IAEA to take apposite decisions to judge the State’s credentials towards nuclear non-proliferation under Article II.
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