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| 1 |
ID:
193634
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| Summary/Abstract |
How did North Koreans reform their agricultural technology after the massive famine in the 1990s? While the existing literature focuses its analysis on the nexus between the state and market to assess the possibility of a transition economy, we instead examine agricultural methods and technologies employed in farmlands to evaluate the nature of technological reforms. After identifying technology reforms on the basis of primary sources published in the DPRK such as yearbooks, academic journals, and newspaper articles, as well as other materials published in South Korea, Japan, and the United States and by international organizations, we classify them into two kinds of initiatives: modernization measures that sought to address the failure to modernize agricultural technologies and ecology-friendly farming practices designed to reduce or reverse negative externalities of the industrial agriculture. While the two are commonly seen as incompatible, we conclude that North Koreans synthesized the two to transform their decaying industrial agriculture into a more modernized and more ecology-friendly sector. They have, through these reforms, maintained food sovereignty as their pillar of agriculture but complemented it with food security on a national scale as a way to maximize their agriculture outputs. Most of these initiatives seem to continue to date although it remains to be seen how these initiatives have affected or will affect the overall productivity and sustainability of the agricultural sector.
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| 2 |
ID:
193637
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This paper explains and corroborates the mechanism by which civic and political spaces opposed to Hindu nationalism were attacked, especially after the arrival of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 2014. Three mechanisms are discerned for replacing pluralistic values with Hindu majoritarian ones. Sometimes institutions are just allowed to drift by interpreting old rules in new ways. For example, no formal rules for media control have changed but the government’s control over media has increased substantially. At other times, incremental legal and policy changes are executed to make the change explicit, often building on a new moral purpose. To give another example, the FCRA (2010) was amended and weaponized against NGOs in a layered way in 2020. Finally, when political opposition is weak, institutions that have provided guarantees for protecting diversity have simply been displaced by new and radically different ones. This was the case with abrogating Article 370, which converted the special status of the sub-national state of Jammu and Kashmir to the status of two federally administered union territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. These mechanisms place India in a competitive authoritarian frame, where electoral majorities are deployed to systematically attack the political opposition, thereby making it more difficult for it to rise. Despite these propensities, opposition parties have won elections in some of India’s sub-national states. The challenges facing the world’s most populous democracy are significant, even though competitive elements co-exist. These elements in a competitive authoritarian regime, however, are under severe stress. India’s democratic credentials can be revived only if the competitive elements of India’s democracy stand united against ethno-nationalist Hindu majoritarianism.
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| 3 |
ID:
193635
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Departing from extant studies that largely focus on gender roles, norm diffusion, or ethnonationalism, this paper highlights policy siting as one understudied factor in determining why and when states manage cultural diversity. Using the case of South Korea’s family-centred multicultural policy, the paper contributes to the growing body of literature on comparative policymaking, multiculturalism, and multi-level citizenship by foregrounding the processes by which governing elites target specific meso-level social institutions as privileged sites of diversity governance. The paper draws on immersive field research conducted between 2017 and 2023 to introduce and analyze the concept of familial multiculturalism to explain how the state locates diversity governance mainly within the family and between family and broader society. Siting diversity governance in powerful meso-level institutions like the nuclear family in shaping state multiculturalism is not unique to Korea. Rather, the paper contends that these institutions play a significant role in cultural management endeavours worldwide. While the content of a multicultural site depends on history and national context, states worldwide seek to mitigate social friction and political backlash by targeting certain intercultural relations and negating or delegitimizing others. The paper concludes with a discussion of the contemporary political ramifications of Korea’s multiculturalism and prospects for future broadening and deepening.
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| 4 |
ID:
193636
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do China and South Korea see their relationship after 30 years of normalization, and why have views shifted since 2017? Research on perceptions and their foreign policy implications usually draws from official discourse and public opinion. This review essay assesses the nature and drivers of China-South Korea mutual perceptions by comparing their academic literature on bilateral relations. Scholarly accounts may offer longer-term interpretations of specialized interests, and a fuller picture of how and why views vary. On both sides of the China-South Korea academic debate, the quantitative volume of studies and qualitative appraisal of relations declined in the 2017–2021 Xi Jinping-Moon Jae-in period. Levels of optimism/pessimism vary by issue-area. Views of third-party constraints on security relations, and domestic political influences on societal relations, drive mutual pessimism. Koreans are more pessimistic about the economic partnership and reassess historical relations more unfavourably, which trace back to views of relative dependence and hierarchy. Three implications emerge for post-2022 relations in light of leadership transition in Beijing and Seoul. Enduring security priorities require minimum strategic interdependence and stronger trust-building mechanisms. Positive functional spillovers from economic and local/nonstate cooperation remain in question. And lasting cultural costs of political disputes compel joint efforts to enhance mutual understanding. Overall, shifts in structural and ideational factors that historically drove normalization are driving the current discord, and prompting both sides to lower future expectations of each other.
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