| Summary/Abstract |
Although UN peace operations began with unarmed observer missions in 1948–1949, the first armed force—the UN Emergency Force (UNEF)—was deployed in 1956 due to the Suez crisis. Scholars and practitioners have since interpreted the UN Secretariat’s 1958 study of that experience, called the Summary Study, as a foundational text in the history of UN peacekeeping because it supposedly codified the key principles of impartiality, nonuse of force, and consent. But much of the Summary Study’s origin story is inaccurate or unknown. By explaining Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s intentions for the study, as well as how those intentions changed, this article argues that far from “codifying” foundational principles, the Summary Study did the opposite: it ensured that future peacekeeping operations would continue on an ad hoc, flexible basis that permitted the Secretary-General and Member States to exercise a wide range of discretion in determining how to conduct future operations.
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