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| 1 |
ID:
193917
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| Summary/Abstract |
Futurist depictions of cyber-attacks in coming wars often portray them as bolts out of the blue that will cause immense damage to a nation’s warfighting capacity and create chaos among its populace by crippling its essential services. However, those depictions are based more on prophecy than they are on historical realities. The historical development of conceptions about cyber operations explains how those themes came to dominate national security discussions about cyber in the United States. Rather than being self-evident, the themes are a result of the application of early cyber efforts to strategic operations, advocacy that focused on doomsday scenarios to draw attention to cybersecurity problems, and the ease with which cyber threats were tied to the primary strategic narratives of American national security during their development.
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| 2 |
ID:
193915
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| Summary/Abstract |
The traditional and high-intensity war that has occured in Ukraine since Russia decided to invade raises a key issue: did post-soviet Russian strategic thought really prepare Russia for waging this war? An analysis of Russian military sources shows that the ‘special military operation’ was not supposed to lead to such a war. Quite the contrary, it was part of the post-Soviet Russian military theorizing about bypassing armed struggle. To understand this theorization and its long-term implementation in Ukraine, it is necessary to analyze the main Russian military debate since 1993: what is war?
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| 3 |
ID:
193914
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Britain initiated its Skynet satellite communications program in 1966 to provide assured connectivity with its forces across the world. Using recently declassified documents, this article reframes the history of British space activities by elucidating how the requirements for flexible and secure defense communications shaped U.K. space policy during the Cold War. Although Skynet inaugurated a communications revolution, it was the product of the longstanding British priority of possessing global information networks under sovereign control. In the Space Age, however, Britain had to reconcile its desire for an autonomous satellite communications network with the reality that American assistance was vital.
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| 4 |
ID:
193916
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, scholars have grappled with the risks and conditions of nuclear-conventional entanglement. One of the examples of entanglement discussed in the academic literature is U.S. nuclear command and control satellites, which have historically served both nuclear and conventional missions. From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. Air Force made a series of programmatic decisions that would, at least in part, reverse this entanglement, separating nuclear from non-nuclear spacecraft. This reversal of nuclear-conventional entanglement in outer space poses strategic consequences, but it was less a strategic choice made by U.S. leadership than the result of acquisition reforms and bureaucratic dynamics.
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| 5 |
ID:
193918
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military AI optimists predict future AI assisting or making command decisions. We instead argue that, at a fundamental level, these predictions are dangerously wrong. The nature of war demands decisions based on abductive logic, whilst machine learning (or ‘narrow AI’) relies on inductive logic. The two forms of logic are not interchangeable, and therefore AI’s limited utility in command – both tactical and strategic – is not something that can be solved by more data or more computing power. Many defence and government leaders are therefore proceeding with a false view of the nature of AI and of war itself.
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