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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
193964
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| Summary/Abstract |
Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.
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| 2 |
ID:
193962
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on cybercrime (2001) remains a key landmark in multilateral governance on cybersecurity. Negotiated over two decades ago, this regional agreement gains renewed significance today through its enduring impact, its rarity as a binding multilateral agreement on cyber-issues, and its role in shaping the debate on free speech and the criminalization of online content. This article asks how the almost-total exclusion of content crimes from the Convention can be explained. Drawing on new documents published for the twentieth anniversary of the Convention, including detailed testimonials from its chair and principal drafters, the article highlights the importance of long-term career connections among technically-savvy and diplomatically experienced negotiators, creating a transnational policy network that overcame differences and power imbalances. Understanding how the Budapest Convention resolved disagreements helps contextualize current crises in multilateral cybersecurity and cybercrime governance and provides a path away from growing digital authoritarianism.
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| 3 |
ID:
193961
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The international cybersecurity regime typifies the rise of informality in modern global governance. Despite the increase in sophisticated cyber operations globally, states do not embrace formal multilateral cooperation to prevent and mitigate them. What explains the preference for informal governance in international cybersecurity, and why have non-binding agreements around “responsible behaviour” proliferated in this domain? In introducing a special issue that highlights various dimensions of informal international cybersecurity governance, this article analyses two major factors that deepen informality: multipolar geopolitics, which has made formal cooperation difficult, and the rise of non-state actors, whose technical standards not only emerge as de facto governance standards, but who have also engaged in cyber diplomacy through informal channels. Drawing on recent scholarship that explains the emergence of informality in global governance, the article calls for greater attention to be paid to the substantive outcomes of informal institutions to understand their stickiness in regimes.
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| 4 |
ID:
193965
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| Summary/Abstract |
Faced with defending against myriad online threats, businesses are increasingly turning to insurers to purchase cyber-insurance policies that will shield them from bearing the full costs of these incidents. Eager not to miss out on the expanding market, insurers have aggressively ramped up their cyber-insurance offerings, and in doing so, have assumed enormous responsibility—and power—as the arbiters of what types of state-sponsored cyber-attacks are covered by insurance. This article argues that insurance companies are influencing multilateral processes and setting de facto standards around responsible state behavior in cyberspace through their policies on risk and liability for serious cyber-operations and “cyber-war.” It approaches this issue through the lens of the 2017 Russian NotPetya cyber-attack which led to significant legal disputes between many insurers and their policyholders about whether Russia’s behavior constituted a “warlike action” and was therefore excluded from insurance coverage under standard war exclusions.
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| 5 |
ID:
193963
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| Summary/Abstract |
The last few years have seen the emergence of a cybersecurity regime complex divided into specialized forums discussing different sub-issues. But how do the main actors in cyberspace make sense of its fragmented governance, and how does that translate to their broader strategic narratives? Furthermore, to what extent are these in line with the predominant macro-narratives in the cyber-domain? To answer these questions, this article explores the strategic narratives of the European Union, Russia, and India in two of these specialized forums: one related to responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the other to cyber-crime. Through the study of narrative fragments — a new approach to the study of strategic narratives in multilateral settings — it concludes that these actors largely include these two issues within their broader strategic narratives. This highlights the importance of cross-issue analysis in the study of multilateral arrangements, particularly in the context of emerging regime complexes.
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