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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
193973
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkish-Israeli relations, which achieved the level of strategic cooperation in the late 1990s, began to decline in the late 2000s, especially after Israel’s 2008–9 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The existing literature enumerates several factors underlying the bilateral relationship but tends to overlook both states’ perceived identities and self-images. Focusing on the identity factor, this article ascribes the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations to the major changes in Turkey’s state identity during the years of AKP rule. By way of substantiating this argument, the article provides a brief overview of the literature on the role of state identity in international relations before exploring four case studies that exemplify the influence of state identity on Turkish-Israeli relations: the bilateral military cooperation agreement (1996); Operation Cast Lead and the attendant ‘Davos incident’ (2008–9); the Mavi Marmara crisis (2010); and the ‘Arab Spring’ of the early 2010s.
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| 2 |
ID:
193980
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| Summary/Abstract |
Multidimensional relations have protected Turkey and Israel from the effects of political crises. The main question of this article is how Turkey-Israel relations impact Turkish Jews business representatives. Interviews with Turkish Jewish businesspeople, who are primarily influenced by the developments in foreign policy due to their international business volumes, answered the question of how Turkish Jews were influenced by foreign policy, and emphasised the importance of minorities in foreign policy issues. The article explores the role of minorities in foreign policy and sheds light on how ethnic minorities, who are viewed as secondary agents in foreign policy, are influenced by the Turkey-Israel relations.
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| 3 |
ID:
193979
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the tensions in Turkish–Israeli relations during the 2010s as well as prospects and challenges of normalisation from an ontological security perspective. Emphasising the role of conflicts in the provision of ontological security, it illustrates how frictions with Israel and attachment to the Palestinian issue serve the identity needs of Turkey’s political elites and provides additional avenues for responding to legitimacy challenges. The article suggests that comprehensive normalisation of relations remains elusive and uncertain despite recent positive steps as this may engender ontological insecurity for both countries and can lead to a backlash towards hostile identities.
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| 4 |
ID:
193974
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Turkish-Israeli ‘honeymoon’ of the 1990s has been explained by different concepts such as alliance, strategic partnership, or cooperation and friendship, with these concepts often used interchangeably. As a corollary of the Turkish official narrative, which is based on a national security approach, certain explanations were offered in justification of the close relationship, including shared traditional democratic culture and secular character, as well as conducive international atmosphere. According to this construction, Turkey had no option but to align with Israel. On the other hand, while the ‘honeymoon’ was often seen as a foreign policy issue directly affected by the military bureaucracy, negative discourses against Israel in domestic politics, and institutional challenges in the Turkish state structure were often ignored. By way of filling this lacuna, the present article evaluates the impact of domestic factors, including the capital-owning class, lobbies, and institutional changes in the Turkish security apparatus on Turkish-Israeli relations.
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| 5 |
ID:
193977
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkish governments and their actions regarding both Israel and the Palestinians have appeared to tilt in favour of one or the other depending on Turkey’s security concerns (both political and economic) and a changing international environment nevertheless they have been consistent in two matters: 1) A preference for a two-state solution to the conflict between the two parties; and 2) Insistence that the old city of Jerusalem should not be under Israeli control. Since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey has been perhaps the most outspoken advocate for the Palestinians, especially for those living in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas, even more so than many Arab states, losing its earlier reputation as a mediator. It is a policy that plays well with Erdoğan’s base as since the 1970s many Turks have developed sympathy with the situation of the Palestinians and had an increasing interest in matters regarding Jerusalem. In recent years, given Turkey’s economic troubles it has shown some determination to repair relations with Israel, but the Israel-Hamas War of 2023 has damaged those ties politically once again.
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| 6 |
ID:
193981
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| Summary/Abstract |
Normalization indicates that states have opened a new page in their bilateral relations, and while it does not cover some problematic areas in relations and does not offer a final solution, it serves to create a reasonable basis for dialogue. The concept of normalisation includes the capacity to transform not only the political but also the economic dimension of Turkish-Israeli relations. This article contends that before the normalisation process in the bilateral relationship, the economic and especially the commercial dimension of the relations remained at a certain level and maintained its strong position even during tense diplomatic and political periods. In this context, the article draws attention to the fact that the normalization of Israel-Turkey relations is an ongoing process and aims to indicate that despite the existence of some disagreements, the search for cooperation on specific issues of common interest may continue.
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| 7 |
ID:
193975
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognise Israel in 1949. While Israeli-Turkish relations have been characterised by ups and downs, mainly due to the Palestinian issue, they reached an all-time low under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. Yet, it was not until 2009 that bilateral relations started to deteriorate. Operation Cast Lead marked a turning point in bilateral relations, followed by a series of crisis: the ‘One Minute crisis’, the ‘Lower Sofa crisis’, and the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis. With both sides’ agreement to restore full diplomatic relations following Israel’s President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Turkey in March 2022, the normalisation process in bilateral relations gained pace, only to go into a swift decline yet again following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023. This article analyses the focal events and dynamics that led to the deterioration and normalisation of bilateral relations under the AKP’s rule. It shows that in addition to the Palestinian issue, the AKP’s foreign policy vision and both states’ divergent security interests created a conducive environment for the deterioration of bilateral relations
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