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| 1 |
ID:
194005
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| Summary/Abstract |
United States support for Ukraine and preparation for a potential, likely protracted, conflict with China has drawn attention to the fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, the American defense industry has optimized for peacetime and low-attrition conflicts, prized efficiency and cost-savings over capacity and flexibility, and incentivized short-run returns over resilience and innovation. While this design may have made sense in a period of undisputed U.S. dominance, the rise of the People’s Republic of China as a peer competitor and the emerging demand that the U.S. deter and, if necessary, win one or more protracted conflicts requires that Washington take a more intentional and direct role in shaping the capability, capacity, and resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base.
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| 2 |
ID:
193995
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| Summary/Abstract |
UK defence reviews have generated a flourishing academic debate for the past one-and-a-half decades. Still, the scholarship has hardly applied organisation and strategic management concepts regarding these reviews and therefore omits relevant insights to understand the outcomes arising from these important strategic documents. This article proposes the organisation and strategic management scholarship can contribute significantly to explaining the dynamics of strategy-making and implementation of the UK’s previous and forthcoming defence reviews. The avoidance of budgetary losses and maintenance of corporate autonomy by any formal organisation – including the UK Ministry of Defence – are particularly powerful concepts for explaining the dynamics of strategy-making and implementation. These concepts are critical for understanding how the UK defence budget is actually spent and how its defence reviews are developed and implemented.
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| 3 |
ID:
194002
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| Summary/Abstract |
Technology is often an importance consideration in a state’s theory of victory. States must consider how technology advances their strategic ends and the most appropriate ways to source technology. As states seek technological overmatch or offsets, they must also wrestle with the strategic cost, risk, and advantage of emerging technologies. Yet, technological advantage is likely to be fleeting. Successful competition depends on states’ ability to scale rapidly in times of crisis, to train soldiers in network-centric and austere environments, to effectively establish norms of AI use, to compete in the diffusion of global dual-use technology, and to question assumptions of technological emergence.
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| 4 |
ID:
194003
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay provides an overview of three avenues by which emerging technology affects the international order: perceptions of technological effects, alliance integration and operability, and compliance with liberal ordering principles. It concludes with three recommendations for policymakers. First, strategically implement the ‘hype’ surrounding emerging technologies. Second, when integrating technology into alliance doctrine, carefully address abandonment and entrapment concerns to ensure ally buy-in. Finally, understand that technological advances have changed the set of options available to policymakers below the level of armed conflict, thereby reverberating on perceptions of the liberal order and opening alternative routes to state alignment.
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| 5 |
ID:
194004
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| Summary/Abstract |
After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has shifted to preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, it would be a mistake to discard hard-earned lessons from these conflicts. Despite contemporary advances in technology and important differences between current US competitors and the Soviet Union, irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition. It was a prominent form of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War, is already used extensively by the United States and its competitors and remains attractive given concerns about escalation between nuclear-armed powers. Given the continued relevance of irregular warfare, we focus on two main lessons from the US experience. First, since irregular warfare is about influencing populations and achieving political goals without large-scale combat operations, influencing and working alongside the partner is the primary mission. The second lesson follows directly from the first; if irregular warfare is ultimately about achieving policy goals with an economy of military force, IW is a team sport requiring joint and interagency collaboration to be effectively implemented.
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| 6 |
ID:
193998
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| Summary/Abstract |
Considering the current instability within the European security landscape, militaries are seeking new ways to grow and counter emergent threats. However, there is a rarity of armed forces addressing logistics growth within literature. Thus, this paper investigates growth concepts that can enable military forces develop, conduct, and grow logistics to achieve its operational objectives. The paper undertakes extant literature analysis of three relevant theories of growth as a means to review for comprehending organizational growth. The relationships between logistics and three growth theories as well as industry growth practices are analysed. Argues that the development of the concept of logistics growth in the military require support not just from established growth theories but also from long-standing industrial practice in order to fully develop the best strategic-fit growth concept for the military. Nine propositions reflecting antecedent relationships amongst theoretical variables for growth are developed. Study serves as a point of departure for further research on military growth in general and military logistics growth in particular and provides military leaders with disciplinary options for evaluating logistics growth strategies for achieving operational objectives and goals.
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| 7 |
ID:
193996
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| Summary/Abstract |
The military domestic deployment in operations involving the use of force attracted particular attention in the last decades for challenging the traditional conception of the armed forces as instruments of foreign policy. It led to concerns about the adequacy of military training and equipment to act domestically against nonmilitary actors, which can be divided into three arguments: training adequacy, threat adequacy, and pragmatism. The present paper argues that these perspectives are embedded in contrasting normative conceptions about how the state’s violence is to be organized. In this sense, the technical narrative works as a mechanism of legitimation, through which claimants convey a sense of obviousness about the armed forces’ deployment, framing it as the only course of action available. This argument is developed through the analysis of the public debate on three military operations in Brazil: Operation Rio (1994–1995), Operation Arcanjo (2010–2012), and Operation Rio de Janeiro (2017–2018).
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| 8 |
ID:
194001
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| Summary/Abstract |
Authoritarian, revisionist, and revanchist powers are exerting pressure on the liberal international order and challenging the United States’ vital security interests across theaters. The United States will increasingly need to simultaneously tackle challenges in two critical theaters while also addressing global threats. To do so effectively, it will need to lean in and actively capitalize on its chief geostrategic advantage over its competitors and adversaries – its global network of alliances and strategic partnerships. However, alliance management faces both traditional and emerging challenges. These range from ensuring effective burden sharing, to providing alliance assurance and balancing interests and values along with allies’ contributions across theaters and domains. In addition, because the United States is operating in a world where all instruments of power, military and non-military, are increasingly utilized in an interconnected way, it will also need to look at defense and security alliance management through the lens of issues ranging from industrial policy to economic security. This essay sheds light on these “old” and “new” challenges, providing insights into critical issues of alliance management that the United States will face in the emerging security environment.
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| 9 |
ID:
193994
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to broaden the understanding of Operational Depth (OD) by rethinking how it can be perceived. The emphasis when doing so is dedicated to cognitive effects, thus another dimension of depth, compared to the mainstream physical- or temporal approaches to depth in military thought. The empirical focus draws on Israel and explicitly the case of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah to provide an example where a lack of physical depth is skillfully handled, hence the title Wizards of Depth. The empiric inquiry is guided by an analytical framework, departing from a theoretical elaboration where OD is approached as a circular trinity: the ability to project, absorb, and manoeuver available coercive assets along offensive and defensive lines of operation. By using this definition in concert with the analytical framework, the article represents a mediation − a dialectic practice between the linear approaches to operations of the West and the more circular, often non-contiguous, and evolving perceptions found further east. When doing so, the article demonstrates how depth can be perceived in various ways, subsequently providing possible avenues to extend depth for actors beyond the Israeli example. A qualitative approach is employed, drawing on extensive fieldwork in Israel.
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