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| 1 |
ID:
194261
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is a paradox that accompanies intelligence failure. Drawn from the work of Richard Betts, one of the most influential scholars in the field of intelligence studies, this paradox is based on two propositions. First, there will always be accurate signals in the “pipeline” before a significant failure of intelligence. Second, intelligence failures are inevitable. Combined, these propositions motivate much intellectual activity in the field of intelligence studies: to devise effective ways to use available information and analysis to avoid failures of intelligence, especially those leading to strategic surprise. This article explores how scholars have addressed these propositions to answer the question: Are intelligence failures still inevitable?
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| 2 |
ID:
194260
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| Summary/Abstract |
Utilizing a conceptual framework of branching in—the ability of the state to utilize internal assets and mechanisms—and branching out—the solicitation of external services—this article introduces several criteria that states must fulfill in order to branch in, namely infrastructure control, offensive cyber capability, and sufficient resources. Subsequently, failure to meet one or more of these criteria forces a branch out toward commodity spyware. Nuances in this argument and the inherent features of commodity spyware also highlight the use of such services even by “branch-in capable” states. The findings within this article offer a broad overview of the factors predilecting state use of commodity spyware, with general applications for both nondemocratic and democratic states.
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| 3 |
ID:
194253
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| Summary/Abstract |
The final months of World War II brought the end of Anglo–Polish cooperation in special operations. Intelligence aspects of this partnership were also important. The scale of wartime intelligence cooperation is shown by Secret Intelligence Service officer Commander Wilfred Dunderdale’s report and the achievements in a special operation in the history of the Polish Section of the Special Operations Executive. The British were concerned that the files of Polish intelligence and the Sixth Bureau dealing with special operations would fall into Moscow’s hands. They also did not intend to provide the authorities in Warsaw with technical achievements of Polish–British cooperation. The Foreign Office and Joint Intelligence Committee did not want to jeopardize efforts to solve the Polish question with the help from the Soviet Union, which controlled most of the prewar area of Poland. The problem was analyzed based on primary sources: archival documents and memories. Analysis shows that the British were not interested in using the resources of the Sixth Bureau and Polish resistance in Soviet-controlled Poland to prepare for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union. Polish émigrés and their agents were an obstacle in relations with Moscow.
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| 4 |
ID:
194257
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two decades after the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic, security intelligence agencies in Serbia are not only far from being reformed, but they play a central role in democracy decline and what many academics and policy officials describe as state capture. Intelligence agencies are among the first victims of state capture and among the major instruments in further capturing state institutions. This process has been a product of the agreed transition from autocracy to democracy that prevented bloodshed but maintained a clientelist relationship between (new) democratic leadership and the (old) security apparatus. Consequently, thorough intelligence reform never happened, resulting in the survival of agencies’ strongholds of power, which facilitated the return to old secret police practice. It is not uncommon today that among important tasks of security intelligence are regime protection through suppression of political opposition and critical voices, as well as making sure that suspicious deals of those close to the ruling party run smoothly. This article aims to map and analyze events and processes that have led to these outcomes and describe how security intelligence is being instrumentalized by the ruling political party and its leader, Aleksandar Vucic.
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| 5 |
ID:
194262
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence services must routinely operate in liminal spaces, both operationally and bureaucratically. The Border Coverage (BOCOV) Program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was a Cold War example of an agency seeking to address the vulnerability inherent to a geographic liminal space. Its implementation of the program illustrated the impact of bureaucratic borders—between the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency and between Intelligence Community (IC) and non-IC agencies. Lessons learned, through the implementation of BOCOV, about interagency relations continue to be applicable as the United States contends with the cyber environment, an even more porous space than the physical U.S.–Mexican border.
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| 6 |
ID:
194255
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| Summary/Abstract |
National security and intelligence communities in democracies have traditionally not been very transparent, in general and specifically in their relations with minority communities. This goes against basic principles of democratic governance, but it is also counterproductive: the lack of transparency hinders these organizations’ ability to protect national security. This article argues that a broader, proactive definition of transparency should replace traditional perspectives to better support enhanced engagement with minority communities. Next, it explains that for its gains to be sustainable, transparency must be institutionalized into the everyday work of national security organizations. Yet enhancing transparency is easier said than done: while the gains tend to emerge in the longer term, risks emerge in the short term. The article concludes by recognizing that enhancing national security transparency in relations with minority communities, although necessary, is complex and time-consuming, a reality underestimated by some of its proponents in civil society.
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| 7 |
ID:
194259
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| Summary/Abstract |
Romania represents one of the paradigmatic cases where security sector reform proceeded quickly after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. The former Securitate was one of the most repressive intelligence services in the communist bloc and drastic reform was necessary in order to establish an efficient and trusted domestic intelligence service. Previous research by Bruneau and Matei highlighted the important steps that Romania has undertaken over the past years and argued that an efficient and robust oversight system has been built. This article addresses contemporary debates on factors triggering reform in parliamentary intelligence and focuses on Romania’s 2017 reforms. These reforms can be analyzed through the application of the “fire alarm/police patrol” model developed by Loch K. Johnson for changes in congressional oversight. By increasing and clarifying the power of the Joint Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the 2017 changes brought more clarity and more accountability to the oversight system. After 2017, the committee reverted to a “police patrol model” focusing on visits to intelligence sites and meetings with high-level intelligence officials.
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| 8 |
ID:
194263
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| Summary/Abstract |
When I arrived in 2006 as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer-in-residence at Boston University (BU), I had no plans to author anything. My colleague at BU, Arthur Hulnick, had also been a CIA officer-in-residence twenty years earlier and had written two books and numerous articles on intelligence. However, Hulnick had had a CIA career as an analyst. Therefore, he had an excuse for writing because analysts are writers. However, he convinced me to write a paper for the intelligence section of the International Studies Association meeting in Chicago the following March. With an introduction to Richard Valcourt, the editor of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence at the time, I found myself on the way not only to publishing articles on intelligence but reviewing books written by former colleagues at the CIA.
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| 9 |
ID:
194254
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| Summary/Abstract |
The phenomenon referred to as socially assisted intelligence (SOASINT) occurs when the work of ideologically motivated agents, mainly volunteers, becomes an indispensable or even dominant factor in the activities of a given intelligence network. Such “irregulars” come from different strata of the societies involved (including women) and fill gaps in the ranks and operational capabilities of professional, state intelligence services. In doing so, they change the character and culture of the entire organization. The text also raises questions about whether SOASINT can be considered a distinct discipline in intelligence research or simply a subcategory or separate doctrine in the framework of human intelligence with specific characteristics. The little-known history of Polish intelligence operations in Scandinavia during and after World War II serves as a model case study. However, intelligence by the Polish underground in the occupied country and France was conducted in a similar in vein. Furthermore, these cases will also be referred to in the text, drawing attention to the role of women in underground intelligence systems, which went from being auxiliary to—in some cases—dominant, which is most evident in the field of covert communications.
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