| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
065664
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| 2 |
ID:
114156
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why, in spite of past failures, do liberal democracies continue to intervene militarily and fight counterinsurgency wars? The answer is grounded in learning. Liberal democracies acknowledge past failures, tracing them to the interaction between the events on the battlefield and society at home. Specifically, they identify the educated middle class and its mix of expedient and altruistic motivations as preventing effective military campaigns and victory. Hence, the main effort of liberal democracies is that they aim to fight wars that are divorced from society. At their disposal are advanced military technology, the professional all-volunteer force, proxies and alliance partners, and private military companies. The desocialising effects of these are complemented by control of the media and thereby the flow of information from the battlefield to society. Liberal democracies have found a way to continue to play the violent game of world politics, but they do so less democratically as they fight asocial wars.
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| 3 |
ID:
055661
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| 4 |
ID:
076373
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| 5 |
ID:
053063
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| 6 |
ID:
050092
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| 7 |
ID:
075715
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| 8 |
ID:
057327
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| 9 |
ID:
054688
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| 10 |
ID:
065661
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| Publication |
1998.
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| Description |
p.39-56
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| 11 |
ID:
018718
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| Publication |
Winter 2000.
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| Description |
275-304
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| 12 |
ID:
069954
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| 13 |
ID:
066362
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| 14 |
ID:
054018
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| 15 |
ID:
105003
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The bases of legitimacy in recourse to war have, in recent years, come to turn vitally on meaningful discrimination between combatants and noncombatants. Concurrently, the remarkable successes of the movement to ban antipersonnel landmines and the follow-on ban on cluster munitions have likewise been predicated on this same arbiter of legitimacy, marking specific kinds of weapons as bad for their inherent indiscriminacy. This article begins by exploring sources of popular expectations that make official claims to discriminacy seem plausible. In particular, the role of popular representation is considered for its foregrounding of the technological feats of precision-guided munitions in ways that mystify ethico-political questions about their use. It is argued that this, more than any objective properties of weapons themselves, has been the truly revolutionary aspect of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The implications of/in this for/by disarmament advocacy of the sort exemplified in the civil society campaign to ban landmines are weighed.
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| 16 |
ID:
087821
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the notion of so-called decisive victory, and the apparent relationship between battlefield victory and strategic success. It argues that there is no necessary causal relationship between what happens on the battlefield and the eventual outcomes of wars. It further argues that the Revolution in Military Affairs, because it appears to render battlefield success so much more attainable, further complicates muddled strategic thinking on these issues, and may actually be counter-productive to strategic success.
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| 17 |
ID:
088769
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| 18 |
ID:
098451
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces' Joint Doctrine of 2007 is analysed in order to illustrate some distinct characteristics of the development of small state doctrines. First, small states have limited freedom and limited institutional capacity to realise their own ideas about the use of their military forces. Furthermore, their contribution of forces to multilateral military operations signals political support for an institution (NATO) or a cause, but they are too small to make a real difference to the military operation. Hence, the operational experiences of these forces differ from those of larger countries. The stakes are lower, and they are unlikely to suffer military defeat in a decisive way. They may suffer losses, but they will not lose a war. As a consequence, small state doctrines at the strategic level have become detached from the question of operational effectiveness and are instead utilised for the purpose of promoting political, legal and ethical messages to the military, to a domestic audience, and to international allies.
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| 19 |
ID:
057349
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| 20 |
ID:
062293
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