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| 1 |
ID:
075484
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| 2 |
ID:
076373
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| 3 |
ID:
122296
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a comprehensive Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) model that is built on previous RMA research. This model examines the political, strategic, and military situation, and technological developments in the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, and argues that nonlethal weapons have a potential to lie at the core of the next RMA.
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| 4 |
ID:
050092
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| 5 |
ID:
075715
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| 6 |
ID:
161359
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| Summary/Abstract |
Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies.
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| 7 |
ID:
054688
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| 8 |
ID:
171138
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emergence of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) offers a comparatively low adoption-cost strategy to emerging great powers that would allow them to offset the conventional military advantage enjoyed by their rivals, which threatens the established global balance of power. This article critically analyses the role of China and the United States in the development of the “hardware” and “software” components of LAWS, concluding that, while the demonstration point has not yet been reached, the incubation of this emerging revolution in military affairs has already begun to have a geopolitical impact.
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| 9 |
ID:
018718
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| Publication |
Winter 2000.
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| Description |
275-304
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| 10 |
ID:
069954
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| 11 |
ID:
071237
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| 12 |
ID:
057349
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| 13 |
ID:
067117
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| 14 |
ID:
064993
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| 15 |
ID:
110676
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| 16 |
ID:
022357
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| Publication |
Aug 2002.
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| Description |
87-112
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| 17 |
ID:
098449
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper re-examines our understanding of the role played by Andrew Marshall in the development of American thinking about the application of information technologies to military systems and concepts of operation that is commonly referred to as the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It asks why Andrew Marshall, unlike many other American officials, saw the developments in this area as a potentially discontinuous, systematic change in military practice, rather than an incremental improvement. The paper identifies a range of prior experiences that made Andrew Marshall more sensitive to the possibility of an RMA, including his work on Soviet nuclear doctrine, and his exposure to sources of intelligence about Soviet military thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. It concludes that the 1990-91 Gulf War was not a major factor in the development of his thinking, and that that war, in fact, may have inhibited more innovative thinking about the RMA in the American military in general.
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| 18 |
ID:
055079
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2003.
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| 19 |
ID:
053627
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| 20 |
ID:
079058
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