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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
004726
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Publication |
Fairbairn, Air Power Studies Centre, 1994.
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Description |
25p.
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Series |
Air Power Studies Centre Paper;22
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Standard Number |
0642202273
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
035656 | 355.422/TRA 035656 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
124784
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the beliefs and patterns of behavior of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in regards to the nature of politics, political conflicts, and the role of agency in shaping events, strategy, and tactics. To do so, it discusses Khamenei's personal background, ideological formation, personality, and foreign policy statements.
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3 |
ID:
182943
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Summary/Abstract |
This article evaluates the possibilities of individual agency in the case of a group of workers employed by a large garment factory in Zhejiang Province. The issue of workers’ ability to exercise power is tested by two sets of facts: workers’ job histories and workers’ household expenses. The author argues that workers’ agency is largely dependent upon gender, age, place of origin, and living arrangements. Workers’ main power is the possibility to quit a job. The overall conclusion is that agency remains limited by the precariousness of workers’ lives from a lifelong perspective.
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4 |
ID:
190024
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Summary/Abstract |
Disputes over self-determination (SD) have led to many civil wars, and a primary alternative, nonviolent campaign, is rarely successful in this context. Yet, while secession is rare, these movements often achieve more limited successes in the form of concessions from the state. This article provides a new assessment of the efficacy of different tactics – violent, nonviolent and conventional political action. It advances an argument that nonviolent tactics can help SD movements to generate indirect pressure on states that contributes to movement success, including greater autonomy. Nonviolence is used to garner attention from international actors using a human rights frame for their cause. International actors that are receptive to these human rights narratives then incentivize concessions for the SD movements and dis-incentivize repression. This happens through a variety of means, such as public shaming of the host state and withholding inter-governmental organization membership. Statistical analysis of violent and nonviolent tactics in SD movements shows that nonviolence can be effective in successfully obtaining concessions. Movements that use nonviolence are twice as likely to see concessions in any given year compared to those that just make demands but do not use nonviolence or violence. The effect of nonviolence is slightly larger than that of violence, which is also associated an increased chance of concession.
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5 |
ID:
188864
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Summary/Abstract |
Cognitive warfare has become the crucial war domain that determines the outcome
of modern wars. Joseph Nye pointed out, “in today’s war, it is not whose army
wins, but whose story wins,” emphasizing the importance of narratives to occupy
human minds and hearts. This has been repeatedly observed in the “War on Terror”
in Afghanistan and Iraq–Syria and the Russia–Ukraine war in 2014 and 2022.
The strategic importance of winning human cognition by the use of non-kinetic
influence operation had been similarly emphasized in the propositions of fifthgeneration warfare and Gerasimov’s suggestions. By recognizing the importance of
cognitive warfare, this paper attempts to address the concept of cognitive warfare
and suggest strategic and tactical principles for its practical operation and use.
The concept of cognitive warfare is still ambiguous, blurring together with related
concepts such as psychological warfare, information warfare, cyberwar, active
measures, and Reflexive Control. Besides, the substantial conceptual differences
between the U.S.–West and Russia have added more confusion. Thus, some
clarification to distinguish the concept of cognitive warfare from other related
terms seems necessary. Meanwhile, neither has there been any concrete proposition
of how cognitive warfare works strategically and tactically. The literature and
earlier reports only introduced various specific effects and techniques of cognitive
operations. Nevertheless, how these effects and techniques are strategically–
tactically integrated and jointly applied for a cohesive cognitive military operation
is yet to be proposed. This paper responds to two such issues of cognitive warfare.
In future warfare, the weight of cognitive warfare is anticipated to increase further.
Hopefully, this paper will be a stepping stone to rouse interest in cognitive warfare
and the development of its strategies and tactics.
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6 |
ID:
130357
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article discusses the developments and innovations in both cyber defence tactics and technologies in the U.S. It tackles the constant changes and dynamic war fighting environment of the country when it comes to cyber threat and exploitation. Moreover, it explores data on the changing landscape of the country's defence industry, the emergence of metadata storage technologies such as NPulse and IOVation, and aspects of cybercrime.
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7 |
ID:
164483
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Summary/Abstract |
For generations, most analysts treated state and nonstate war making as a dichotomy, with states employing high-intensity ‘conventional’ methods centered on seizing and holding ground, but with nonstate actors using low-intensity ‘irregular’ methods such as roadside bombings, ambushes, and assassinations. This article, by contrast, argues that many nonstate actors have adopted substantially conventional warfighting styles, and that more are likely to do so over time. Increasingly, the best predictor of a combatant’s military methods is not its status as a state as opposed to a nonstate actor, but its internal politics – and especially its institutional maturity and war aims.
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8 |
ID:
131976
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982-2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence.
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9 |
ID:
186937
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Summary/Abstract |
The Anti-Extradition Bill protests in 2019 culminated in an unprecedented level of violence that departed from the established peaceful social struggles in Hong Kong. This paper examines the evolution of protest repertoires by analysing the interactions between protesters and state actors on a local and global scale. A dataset is presented to show the type, frequency and distribution of tactics. This paper reveals that structural and cultural changes as well as activists’ cognitive, affective and relational transformations at the micro- and meso-levels were pertinent to tactical radicalization. Cognitively, militant tactics were pragmatic responses to state-sponsored violence and police violence. They were also the affective outcomes of grief and anger. These processes were intertwined with the relational dynamics that advocated horizontal mobilization and that shaped, and were shaped by, the political-economic interactions between China and the West. The result was an extensive use of violent tactics alongside innovations in non-violent tactics.
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10 |
ID:
175119
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Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes how contemporary military training and exercises shape and reify specific modalities of war. Historically, military training has shifted from being individual- and experience-oriented, towards becoming modelled into exercise environments and practices. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with military officers, exercise controllers, and war-game designers, the article distinguishes between tactical training, characterized by military functions embodied through weapon platforms in a demarcated battlespace, and operational training, characterized by administrative and organizational processes embodied through self-referential staff routines. As military exercises integrate the tactical and operational dimensions into a model for warfare, they serve as blueprints for today’s battles at the same time as they perpetuate a martial viewpoint of the world. As a result, preparations for potential future conflicts constitute a fertile ground for apprehending the becoming of war.
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11 |
ID:
138787
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12 |
ID:
171644
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Summary/Abstract |
This study examines simulated battle settings, to analyze how tactics are performed and victory is achieved by observing tacticians dueling in wargames. In contemporary warfare, victory in battle relates to a wide variety of elements. According to military theory, these elements commonly involve deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and shock, resulting in enemy organizational breakdown. Ideally, if one side in combat exploits all elements successfully, the likelihood of victory increases. Although the use of the tactical elements is not always obvious to the participants, the study indicates a correlation between using the elements and victory in a wargame setting. Although wargames inherent bias by not being the real world, they are used in training, education and analysis worldwide. The study also illustrates that the participants view tactical victory differently in battle.
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13 |
ID:
083036
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
The robust approach of the American forces in for example Afghanistan and Iraq is often criticised and compared to the more soft approach of the British forces. However, there are surprisingly few systematic studies on the relationship between the conduct of force and the outcome of peace operations. Two kinds of military conduct in Afghanistan have been explored in this article, one that could be called 'minimum force' and one that could be called 'show of force'. Contradicting the commonly held idea of the superiority of 'minimum force', 'show of force' correlated with a better outcome than the 'minimum force' approach. However, before arguing that a 'show of force' approach is a better way to conduct peace operations, more reliable data on the outcome, and additional case studies, are needed.
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14 |
ID:
150966
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15 |
ID:
045467
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Publication |
Cambridge, Patrick Stephens, 1983.
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Description |
176p.
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Standard Number |
0850596173
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
024828 | 358.43/SPI 024828 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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16 |
ID:
186966
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the relationship between prior conflict experience and the impact of foreign fighters on armed groups. This paper addresses the findings in existing research that describes foreign fighters as both assets and liabilities by disaggregating foreign fighters into first-conflict foreign fighters and veteran foreign fighters. While prior experience determines the potential impact of foreign fighters, I introduce the concept of foreign fighter integration to understand how this experience is utilized or leveraged by armed groups. The theory-building framework helps explain why we see certain groups leverage foreign fighters in ways that shape their repertoires of violence, tactics, or even ideology, while, in other instances, the influence of foreign fighters appears to be limited – with any consequent effects restricted to the small factions into which foreign fighters have been assigned. Using this theoretical framework of experience and integration, I re-examine in the cases Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to demonstrate how and where foreign fighters impact armed groups.
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17 |
ID:
108291
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18 |
ID:
120427
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
What are key historical trends in insurgencies? And what do these finding suggest about the future of insurgency? We examine four aspects: causes of insurgency, outside support, strategies, and tactics. Based on an examination of quantitative and qualitative data, we make several arguments about the future. China could become increasingly involved in supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies if its economic and military power continues to increase and its global interest expands. In addition, insurgent groups will likely require less time to achieve high levels of sophistication for improvised explosive devices and other asymmetric tactics, which we expect they will use against more powerful mechanized counterinsurgent forces. We also expect that insurgent groups may take advantage of commercially-available technology to communicate, distribute propaganda, and recruit individuals. In addition, insurgents will likely make further use of encryption, anonymizing services, location-masking tools, and other related technologies to protect their online activities.
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19 |
ID:
175343
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Summary/Abstract |
Previous research on the causes of domestic terrorism has tended to focus on domestic determinants. Although this approach can be helpful to understand many causes of terrorism, it implicitly disregards how the tactical choices made by similar nonstate actors elsewhere influence a group’s decision to resort to terrorist tactics. This study argues that the adoption of terrorism among ethnic and ethnoreligious groups results from a process of conditional emulation. Groups are more likely to emulate the terrorist choice of others with whom they are connected by shared political grievances and spatial networks. The theory is tested on a new and original group-level data set of ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism (1970 to 2009) using geospatial analysis and spatial econometric models. The results provide strong support for the hypothesized mechanism leading to the diffusion of terrorism and suggest that emulation—more than domestic and contextual factors—substantially influences dissidents’ tactic choice.
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20 |
ID:
110080
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper presents an analysis of the multiple effects of greater military materiel and troop quantities on the conduct of counterinsurgency. Although counterinsurgency is often considered a manpower intensive form of warfare, this paper posits that several dangers are inherent in the provision of more troops to the waging of such campaigns. Using the British counterinsurgency in Malaya as an illustrative, inductive case study, this article argues that greater materiel strength distorts the counterinsurgency's tactical and operational efforts, which can then dislocate their strategic plans.
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