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| 1 |
ID:
036300
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| Publication |
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1974.
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| Description |
xviii, 526p.hbk
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| Series |
SIPRI Yearbook 1974
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| Standard Number |
0262191296
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 017375 | 327.17405/SIP 017375 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
161351
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.
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| 3 |
ID:
012484
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| Publication |
Summer 1997.
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| Description |
143-51
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| 4 |
ID:
059744
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2005.
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| 5 |
ID:
171540
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| 6 |
ID:
022513
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| Publication |
Sept 2002.
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| Description |
227-238
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| 7 |
ID:
130001
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| 8 |
ID:
067217
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| 9 |
ID:
137969
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Orient Blackswan, 2015.
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| Description |
xv, 213p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788125058533
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058194 | 327.17470954/VAN 058194 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
066669
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| 11 |
ID:
082371
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
includes both preemptive and preventive attacks. Anticipatory attacks cannot be excluded as options for policymakers and military planners. On the other hand, preemption and preventive options must be used with care. Even when they are employed with favorable military results, anticipatory attacks can have undesirable political side effects. Nuclear anticipatory attacks raise issues in addition to conventional ones. Deterrence based on preemptive threat of nuclear attack is less fault-tolerant than deterrence based on the threat of conventional preemption
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| 12 |
ID:
046232
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| Edition |
2nd ed.
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| Publication |
London, Sage Publications, 2002.
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| Description |
xliii, 396p.
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| Standard Number |
0761940162
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046011 | 327.174/GOL 046011 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
151030
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper elucidates basic theoretical points of the functional approach to estimate the correlation between strategic forces of sides in a multipolar world, and specifies the theoretical base of this functional approach with a view to further using the latter in the interests of addressing a broader range of applied problems. It reviews categories of strategic forces balance in coalitions, formulates the concept of the extent of unacceptable damage for opposing coalitions, and substantiates the potential of using the functional approach to tackle direct and inverse problems related to the assessment of strategic forces in coalitions.
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| 14 |
ID:
091631
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence'- that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements.
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| 15 |
ID:
019614
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| Publication |
Dec 2000.
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| Description |
239-256
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| 16 |
ID:
069239
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| 17 |
ID:
131272
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| 18 |
ID:
129711
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| 19 |
ID:
034615
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| Publication |
London, Macdonald and Jane's, 1977.
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| Description |
xii, 314p.
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| Standard Number |
0844809748
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 017307 | 355.031/HOL 017307 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 20 |
ID:
183355
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Biden administration finalizes its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), it faces the same challenges as the architects of the four earlier NPRs: how to make choices about nuclear deterrence and translate them into nuclear strategy and force structure. If it chooses to learn from the experience of its predecessors, the administration will confront two sets of requirements that are central to U.S. nuclear deterrence policy yet limit its freedom of action. The NPR managers would be wise not to just buy into those requirements but instead to be explicit and transparent about questioning them in order to enable choices that are based on a clear understanding of the trade-offs, as well as other possible options.
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