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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
073251
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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| Description |
xi, 322p.
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| Standard Number |
0521858704
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051531 | 320.445/ROB 051531 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
079674
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Responding to British complaints in 1987 of excessive focus on human rights violations in South Africa, four professional associations launched a massive survey of human rights throughout the Commonwealth. Dismayed by inadequacies in the Harare Declaration, the CHRI became a formal non-governmental institution and published a searching study of rights violations in different contexts ahead of each Commonwealth summit. Its headquarters rotated in 1993 to Delhi from where a worldwide program to increase freedom of information and press for reform of police and prison systems, as the basis for securing other human rights, has made impressive headway. The article also describes its impact on the Commonwealth Secretariat's work and its involvement with the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
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| 3 |
ID:
148033
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Some argue that the right kinds of institutions mitigate, or even prevent, the development of “natural resource curses.” Rulers with access to resource wealth, however, are unlikely to adopt such institutions, because doing so would undermine their discretionary power. We examine this proposition by testing whether countries with access to natural resource wealth prove less likely to adopt transparency-promoting Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. Using panel data on 139 countries between 1980 and 2012 (33 years), we find that, after accounting for current levels of democracy and the quality of institutions, countries deriving rents from natural resource are, indeed, less likely to adopt FOI laws. We also find that oil, but not other kinds of resources, is robustly related to a lower probability of adopting FOI laws. However, in countries with strong democracy and high institutional quality, higher income from resources is positively associated with the chance of adopting FOI laws. This suggests that rulers of countries with high resource wealth need to face high political constraints already before they adopt institutional changes. It follows that global policy aimed at increasing transparency within resource-wealthy states should focus efforts on strengthening democracy in ways that increase political competition.
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| 4 |
ID:
030320
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| Publication |
Washington, U.S.Gobernment Printing Office, 1981.
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| Description |
v,1022p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 024489 | 323.445/UNI 024489 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
030910
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| Publication |
London, Longmans, 1969.
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| Description |
vii, 336p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 004234 | 323.445/WIL 004234 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
081022
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| Publication |
New York, Columbia University Press, 2007.
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| Description |
viii, 368p.
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| Series |
Initiative for policy dialogue at columbia
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| Standard Number |
9780231141581
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053172 | 352.88/FLO 053172 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
173883
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| Summary/Abstract |
State secrecy is incompatible with the values of liberal democracy if there is no publicly reasonable justification for the concealment. So how can a liberal democracy continue to keep state secrets amidst suspicion that no such justification exists or that, worse, those secrets contain evidence of wrongdoing? This article maps and critiques the justificatory strategies that were used by the British state to refuse to disclose secret material related to the 2003 Iraq War, despite widespread accusations of hidden deception and illegality. Through an analysis of the legal discourse that underpins freedom of information (FOI) and disclosure protocols, the article shows how the law regulates disclosure through a metaphorical ‘balance’ of public interests. This balance, however, is no balance at all. It is profoundly one-sided because security only features on one side. The law explicitly recognizes that disclosure can create insecurity for public interests, but lacks any recognition of the opposite: the insecurity of secrecy. Rather than security trumping liberal values, this law allows enduring secrecy to be framed, paradoxically, as a means to secure liberal democratic accountability. The significance of this claim is far-reaching as FOI laws in many other countries employ a similar harm-based, one-sided justificatory strategy.
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| 8 |
ID:
131215
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| 9 |
ID:
107735
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| Publication |
New York, Public Affairs, 2011.
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| Description |
xi, 339 p.
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| Standard Number |
9781610390613
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056033 | 323.445/LEI 056033 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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