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| 1 |
ID:
101902
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past two years, China's foreign policy has become markedly more belligerent toward both its neighbors and the United States. But Washington should not wish for a weaker Beijing. In fact, on problems from nuclear proliferation to climate change, what the United States needs is a more confident and constructive China as a partner.
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| 2 |
ID:
073505
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to prevent nuclear proliferation is once again topping the U.S. security agenda. But few decision-makers are seriously considering what a postproliferation world would look like, even though such a world would inevitably require rethinking many of the policies that the U.S. government and others now take for granted.
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| 3 |
ID:
138170
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| Summary/Abstract |
A prominent model of nuclear proliferation posits that a powerful patron state can prevent a weaker ally from proliferating by providing it with security guarantees. The history of West Germany's pursuit of the bomb from 1954 to 1969 suggests that a patron may also need to threaten the client state with military abandonment to convince it not to acquire nuclear weapons.
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| 4 |
ID:
163389
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Donald Trump appears to have intensified the danger of U.S. allies wanting their own nuclear weapons, but such concerns are exaggerated. U.S. alliances are more resilient than commonly presumed with actual force deployments, which don’t appear to be changing any time soon, mattering more than rhetoric to make security guarantees adequate for the foreseeable future.
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| 5 |
ID:
054497
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| 6 |
ID:
060371
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| Publication |
Mar-Apr 2005.
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| 7 |
ID:
076710
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Good intelligence is critical to support U.S. policy efforts to counter nuclear proliferation, but the historical record is mixed. This article reviews several past cases of nonproliferation success and failure, including the Soviet Union, China, India, Libya, Iraq, and the A. Q. Khan network. Intelligence frequently provides warning, and in some cases concrete and timely information has enabled nonproliferation successes. On the other hand, failures often result from a lack of detailed and specific information adequate to overturn erroneous assumptions or preconceptions. Improvements in intelligence are needed, but correct assessments of foreign programs cannot be guaranteed. A close and healthy relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers is also a key factor in making the most of insights that are developed.
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| 8 |
ID:
062325
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Viva Book Publisher, 2005.
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| Description |
xviii, 413p.
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| Standard Number |
8130900807
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049653 | 327.174/LAR 049653 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
053364
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| 10 |
ID:
132005
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States' military-strategic pivot toward Asia is motived by concerns about a rising China, about the increased significance of Asia on the world economic and political stages, and about the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear first use in that region. Nuclear Asia already numbers five acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states among its members: Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Failure to reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons status or political distrust among other powers may increase the number of Asian nuclear weapons states (including states with prospective nuclear-missile reach into Asia) to eight, creating an Asian-Middle Eastern nuclear arms race that defies containment. On the other hand, an alternative presents itself, in the form of a multilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement that would create three tiers of accepted nuclear weapons states and bar the door to new admits.
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| 11 |
ID:
002853
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| Publication |
London, Brassey', 1993.
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| Description |
132p.
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Adelphi Paper; 276
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| Standard Number |
185753073X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034370 | 327.5/ASI 034370 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
155090
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This paper explores the probable causes and consequences of an Asian Paradox or the highly incongruous structure of Asia within the broader international system: at once the engine of global economic growth while at the same time, the repository of all of the world's outstanding security threats and challenges. Asia in the 21st century is going to be a key test bed of the commercial peace theory and whether the U.S.-China strategic rivalry will result in some type of a conflict. Attention is also paid to the potential consequences flowing from the end of Asia's Meiji era or when all of Asia's major powers and key middle powers have achieved or are well on their way of achieving what Japan accomplished by the late 1890s: a wealthy economy and a strong military. How an increasingly wealthy, technologically advanced, and a militarily sophisticated Asia decides to cope with numerous security dilemmas is Asia's new Long March including the extent to which the region's strategically consequential states are willing to preserve and to strengthen the prevailing liberal international order.
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| 13 |
ID:
082211
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article develops a novel assessment of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Using a theory-driven approach rooted in comparative foreign policy analysis, the article undermines two common assumptions about the DPRK nuclear threat: first, that the North Korean leadership's nuclear intentions are a measured response to the external environment and, second, that the DPRK has developed enough technical capacity to go nuclear whenever it pleases. In place of these assumptions, the article puts forth the general theoretical hypotheses that (1) the decision to go nuclear is rarely if ever based on typical cost-benefit analysis, and instead reflects deep-seated national identity conceptions, and (2) the capacity to go nuclear depends not only on raw levels of industrialization and nuclear technology, but also on the state's organizational acumen. Applied to the case of the DPRK, these hypotheses suggest that it has long been strongly committed to the goal of acquiring an operational nuclear deterrent, but also that it has been finding it very difficult to successfully implement that wish. The article also demonstrates that these hypotheses are supported by the meager evidence available on this case
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| 14 |
ID:
076722
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From a proliferation perspective, Latin America has become one of the most denuclearized regions of the planet, and barring some revolutionary transformation of the international system, it is likely to remain so during the next decade. A combination of a paucity of credible external threats, widespread democratization, and the systematic resolution of border conflicts, particularly in the Southern Cone region, mean that states in the region do not see the value of acquiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The two states in the region with the most advanced civilian nuclear programs, Argentina and Brazil, have created a sophisticated mutual inspection regime that is an additional barrier to the development of any new proliferation network, and both states have a strong interest in maintaining a benign regional security environment. Venezuela's radical leader, Hugo Chávez, has expressed an interest in developing a nuclear power program, raising concerns among some observers over a potential new proliferation risk. However, Venezuela currently lacks the scientific and management expertise required to master nuclear technology within the next decade.
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| 15 |
ID:
183695
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How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.
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| 16 |
ID:
104330
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they 'work' by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure.
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| 17 |
ID:
127167
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| 18 |
ID:
087446
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.
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| 19 |
ID:
008591
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| Publication |
Spring 1995.
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| Description |
183-202
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| 20 |
ID:
060743
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| Publication |
Winter 2004-05.
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