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| 1 |
ID:
018264
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| Publication |
Dec 2000.
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| Description |
885-895
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| 2 |
ID:
154928
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper aims to show trading patterns of certain items highly likely to be used
to develop nuclear and missile programs in North Korea. It analyzed North Korea’s
trade of nuclear―and missile―related items for ten years from 2006 to 2015 to
identify items in large volume as well as in increased demand and key suppliers
that contribute to sanctions―busting. This paper found that UN sanctions against
North Korea were not effective in controlling the flow of strategic items to North
Korea. Rather, a small number of states are responsible for a large share of trade
with North Korea that has continued to seek alternative suppliers. It also found
that China is a single supplier for multiple items and plays a major role along with
several others that either specialize in exports of specific items or gradually expand
the scope of supplies. Because the presence of a third country that provides North
Korea’s resilience and diversion of sanctions is crucial, this paper recommends
policy suggestions to enhance effectiveness of the existing sanctions regime.
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| 3 |
ID:
124772
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Technological ties between Israel and China have always been a central and constant element of their relationship. Defense contracts played a leading role here but were also responsible for the severe crisis that erupted between the countries in the early 2000s after Israel, capitulating to US pressure, backed off from its commitment to provide China with military technologies. This not only forced Israel to sever its defense relations with China but also made US-Israel relations a principal factor in the Sino-Israeli connection and imposed tight constraints on Israel's technology transfers to China generally. For Israel, this placed the dilemma of commercial versus political and national security interests at the forefront, since technology connections allowed it to promote its economic, political, and strategic causes through China. Indeed, while technology ties between the states have not stopped entirely-they have shifted to the civilian sphere-technology transfers to China are subject to heavy limitations, and Israel's export control mechanism faces greater challenges to screen them. As China's economic and political influence is ever increasing, Israel's cautious approach to technology transfers to China may be expected to come under mounting pressure.
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| 4 |
ID:
008591
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| Publication |
Spring 1995.
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| Description |
183-202
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| 5 |
ID:
068570
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| 6 |
ID:
079662
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| 7 |
ID:
007005
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| Publication |
Spring/ Summer 2000.
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| Description |
84-116
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| 8 |
ID:
061000
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| 9 |
ID:
066574
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| 10 |
ID:
056803
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| 11 |
ID:
064341
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| 12 |
ID:
020039
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| Publication |
Summer 2001.
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| Description |
69-80
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| 13 |
ID:
061428
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| Publication |
May-Jun 2005.
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| 14 |
ID:
058418
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| 15 |
ID:
061279
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2005.
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| 16 |
ID:
021333
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| Publication |
Jan-March 2002.
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| Description |
52-61
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| 17 |
ID:
066723
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| 18 |
ID:
056807
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| 19 |
ID:
089998
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the system developed within Europe, more precisely within the European Union through European Community law, to address the security-sensitive issues involved in the export of hardware, software, and knowledge for the purpose of space activities and major space applications. The subject is introduced with reference to the far better known export control developments within the United States, such as those concerning International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the international understandings under the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement. European Community Regulations for export controls provide for a complex system of balances between national sovereignty and Europe-wide harmonization. This European Community regime, though ultimately still dependent upon individual state's sovereign controls, establishes an interesting measure of international harmonization in security-sensitive export controls. Although the European Community regime is fraught with many complexities, it manages to avoid some of the pitfalls evident in the United States and international regimes, notably the confusing discussions on discerning weaponry proper from other space items with dual-use potential. This is the result mainly of an approach characterized by a primary intention to harmonize, rather than to apply strict controls per se, resulting in a transparency and consistency that are not only valuable to commercial entrepreneurs, but also to those concerned primarily with the security risks posed by the international space industry. As for the space industry in particular, it is helpful that the European Community regime specifically carves out civil space activities, for example if conducted within the context of the European Space Agency or national space agency activities.
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| 20 |
ID:
019425
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| Publication |
Summer 2001.
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| Description |
13-18
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