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1 |
ID:
181709
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Summary/Abstract |
France has emerged as a country with ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. It has vast territories, population and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific which necessitate a coherent national security policy towards this region. Even before the promulgation of its Indo-Pacific strategy, France has been involved in maritime Asia, primarily through defence sales. The changing balance of power has renewed European attention towards the Indo-Pacific wherein France is making its mark. This article studies the drivers of the French Indo-Pacific strategy and goes further to understand the fundamentals that have led to French attention to this region. A careful study of all major French policy articles lays out the strategic thinking in Paris. The article briefly presents bilateral and multilateral engagements of France. While traditional and non-traditional security issues and normative drive are apparent in the public discourse, it is clear that the major drivers are France's military–industrial complex and the desire to be able to influence the regional order.
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2 |
ID:
074213
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3 |
ID:
139989
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Summary/Abstract |
Australia, Japan and the USA are all facing dual pressures that require them to do more with less. Internationally, they deal with the challenge of managing China’s rapid rise. However, domestically, they must cut government spending and reduce government debt. With internal balancing effectively ruled out as a long-term solution, the three states are seeking ways to optimise external balancing, or cooperation with like-minded states. This article focuses on Australian motivations regarding the recent proposal for submarine cooperation with Japan, and places it in the context of longer trends that poise the USA, Australia and Japan for even greater trilateralism in the future. Australia’s proposal to buy submarines from Japan, should it go through, would cement Australia and Japan’s fledgling security relationship in steel and coin. For Australia, it would help it to overcome its undersea capability gap, and Japan could set a precedent to re-enter the global weapons market if all goes well. Furthermore, Australia can use defence-technology cooperation with Japan to signal to the USA the seriousness of its commitment to burden-share in pursuit of regional security and determination to politically support the USA’s ‘Pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific. However, domestic politics have begun to play an important role in Australia, with a ‘spill’ motion against Prime Minister Tony Abbott barely overcome by a backroom deal with the opposition to build the submarines domestically, and this is an important development to keep an eye on.
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4 |
ID:
191827
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Summary/Abstract |
The AUKUS agreement to facilitate Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines has been described by its critics as a ‘bet' on the U.S. This bet entails serious risks for Australia. These risks include uncertainty around construction of the submarines; uncertainty around the U.S.'s long-term commitment to the region; and uncertainty about the future political trajectory of the U.S. These risks are compounded by the sovereignty-constraining implications of AUKUS. The reliance on U.S. technical expertise, and the demands of military interoperability, will bind Australian defence policy more closely to the U.S. than ever. Hence, AUKUS is a deal that demands close scrutiny. This article contributes to such scrutiny, exploring the risks associated with this bet on the U.S. In particular, it examines the ‘America’ that Australian governments expressly want – a liberal internationalist America with a strong commitment to democracy – and then contrasts this with the America that Australia does not want but may well get: an illiberal America that is increasingly anti-democratic at home and crudely transactional, protectionist and undiplomatic abroad. The obvious problem with this approach, we argue, is that Australia does not get to choose the presidential administration in the U.S. over the next twenty to forty years.
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5 |
ID:
011471
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Publication |
march 1997.
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Description |
44-47
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6 |
ID:
011984
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Publication |
June 1997.
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Description |
30-33
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7 |
ID:
126465
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
St Petersburg: In India, warnings are seldom taken seriously. Even disasters that follow the warnings are usually accepted with a sense of philosophical fatalism. So, for whatever it is worth, here is a warning from the Rubin Design Bureau of Russia which has designed the Kilo class submarines, 10 of which the Indian Navy operates: Two Indian submarines are past their service life and the third one is quickly on the way. Anything can happen to these boats and the responsibility will be of the Indian Navy.
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8 |
ID:
086131
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Many aspects of the Chinese-U.S. relationship are mutually beneficial: some $400 billion in trade, bilateral military exchanges, and Beijing's increasingly constructive diplomatic role. There are other grounds for concern. Each side's militaries view the other as a potential adversary and increasingly make plans and structure their forces with that in mind.
On the conventional side, there are many important areas to consider, but the potential for nuclear rivalry raises monumental risks. This article assesses the dangers in the bilateral nuclear relationship, the potential for traditional arms control to address these challenges, the broadening of the "strategic" military sphere, and the issue of proliferation beyond the bilateral relationship.
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9 |
ID:
010255
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Publication |
March/April 1996.
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Description |
18-19
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10 |
ID:
114042
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The author discusses the specifics of communication with naval forces in various environments. He shows ways of improving naval communications facilities in view of the interservice standardization of the Russian Armed Forces' control system.
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11 |
ID:
103791
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12 |
ID:
010068
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13 |
ID:
127755
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14 |
ID:
021837
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Publication |
July-Aug 2002.
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Description |
18-23
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15 |
ID:
016537
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Publication |
1993.
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Description |
31-35
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16 |
ID:
023240
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Publication |
Dec 2002.
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Description |
33-37
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17 |
ID:
131038
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
In August 2013, India successfully launched its latest dedicated defence satellite GSAT-7. Planned to serve as an exclusive defence satellite for the Indian Navy, the satellite, as Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), boasted of its safety and reliable communication. Although ISRO, which is popularly seen as a civilian space agency, could not openly accept the defence usage of this satellite, analysts claim that this satellite will serve as a force multiplier and help navy in networking all its warships, submarines and aircrafts with its ground based assets. The satellite will help the Indian Navy strengthen its blue water combat capabilities. This advanced multi-band communication satellite was launched by Ariane-5 launch vehicle of Arianespace from Kourou, French Guiana.
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18 |
ID:
150275
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19 |
ID:
070877
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20 |
ID:
124280
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
India's nuclear deterrence capability has also matured and has been given concrete shape in the last nine years. The country already has the Agni series of ballistic missiles and fighters to deliver nuclear weapons. Moreover, it will finally complete its nuclear triad when indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant becomes full operational towards end 2013.
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