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| 1 |
ID:
130868
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Asia's reliance on international, seaborne energy trade is conducive to strategic cooperation. Whether this will outweigh strategic competition is far from certain. The Asia-Pacific accounts for a large and growing share of the world's energy-demand growth. With imports rising faster than consumption, the region is rapidly becoming the new centre of gravity for global energy markets. Such dynamics have made energy security a key policy concern for Asian states. The naval capacities of these countries are also growing swiftly, prompting some analysts to ask whether an arms race has begun. Although no one would suggest that this build-up of naval power is primarily driven by the need to secure energy supplies, the Chinese and Indian governments have identified energy and resource security as one rationale for developing naval power, particularly blue-water capabilities.
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| 2 |
ID:
162503
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| Publication |
Heidelberg, Springer, 2015.
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| Description |
xx, 318p.hbk
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| Series |
Global Power Shift: Comparative Analysis and Perspectives
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| Standard Number |
9783662471265
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059559 | 359.00951/KIR 059559 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
133403
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Land-sea wars" have significant maritime dimensions, with command of the sea posited by this study as mattering more than either [land combat] skill or strength. . . . [C]ommand of the sea is a preeminent form of power that determines the outcome of land-sea conflicts.
JOHN ARQUILLA
In a February 2012 article published in the American Interest, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staffof the U.S. Air Force, and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, provide solid justification for more closely integrating Air Force and Navy capabilities into an Air-Sea Battle strategy.1 We applaud the Air-Sea Battle component as the most effective means of preparing for the most challenging conflict-full-scale conventional war
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| 4 |
ID:
105479
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| 5 |
ID:
095873
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena.
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| 6 |
ID:
170785
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is in the process of becoming an Atlantic naval power, Ryan D Martinson argues. Since 2014, the activities of the Chinese navy in the South Atlantic have evolved from port visits and largely symbolic joint exercises to independent operations at sea. This helps the Chinese navy to gain familiarity with the operating environment, so that it can effectively respond when called on by civilian leaders to protect China’s growing interests in the region. China’s increased naval presence in the South Atlantic may also reflect a shift in Beijing’s strategy for countering perceived threats from the US military in the Western Pacific.
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| 7 |
ID:
108218
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| Publication |
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2010.
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| Description |
xxix, 529p.
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| Standard Number |
9781591142430, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056221 | 359.030951/ERI 056221 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
184354
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| 9 |
ID:
079143
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 1932 and 1939, the USSR adopted a new approach to the exploration and development of its Arctic territories by creating the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route (GUSMP). The Soviets' principal strategy here was one of hypercentralization: beforehand, they had entrusted Arctic work to a variety of agencies, but after the First Five-Year Plan, they became convinced that the uniquely rigorous conditions of the extreme north made it desirable to vest a single all-purpose agency with nearly complete authority over the Soviet Arctic. GUSMP enjoyed many successes, including several high-profile polar exploits that won international renown, but, in the end, was unable to satisfy the dictates of the state, especially with respect to economic development. In 1938-1939, most of GUSMP's authority had been stripped away; the primary beneficiary of its downfall was the notorious Main Administration for Construction in the Far North (Dal'stroi). GUSMP's failure was due not only to flaws in its own design and operation, but also to the unreasonable demands of the regime. Regardless, it managed before and after 1939 to develop the northern coastal infrastructure to an extent sufficient to support the USSR's military needs by the time war came in 1941.
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| 10 |
ID:
138697
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All military operations are attended by various forms of risk. Risk permeates the fabric of war—from the actions of individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen to the policies, strategies, and decisions of national leaders. Decisions and actions have both potential and real consequences, and intelligent decision making normally involves a calculation of the odds for success and failure, as well as consideration of the consequences of potential failure. When success is less than a sure thing but through analysis of the salient aspects of the problem, including costs and consequences of failure, a commander decides to proceed nonetheless,
we can say that he is taking a “calculated risk.
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| 11 |
ID:
089062
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| Publication |
2009.
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While India may not traditionally be considered to be a significant actor in the Asia-Pacific region, over the past 18 years, New Delhi has undertaken a concerted effort to direct its foreign, economic, and military policies eastward. What began as economic cooperation with the nations of Southeast Asia has expanded into full-spectrum engagement with the major powers of East Asia. This article explores India's emergence in the Asia-Pacific, concluding that, while in the near term India's presence and influence will be felt most strongly in Southeast Asia, a steadily expanding economy, paired with a growing partnership with key regional actors and an increasingly capable Navy, positions the South Asian giant to have an impact on the emerging security architecture of the region.
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| 12 |
ID:
133797
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The early setbacks suffered by the Royal Navy during the Second World War have long coloured historians' assessments of the navy's standing during the interwar years, with a consensus settling around a narrative of decline. Yet Joseph A Maiolo argues that, following the strategic victory of the First World War, the Admiralty manoeuvred with great agility to respond to, and curtail, the rise of other naval powers such as the US, Japan and Germany without setting in motion another naval arms race. The result was that by 1939, the Royal Navy was well positioned to play its part in the second global conflict of the twentieth century
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| 13 |
ID:
114607
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emergence of naval power amongst the littoral states of the Straits
of Malacca has provided them with increasingly capable and self-reliant
naval capabilities. This naval build-up can be attributed to the growing
importance of vital sea-lines of communication due to the increased
reliance on seaborne trade and other reasons, such as the perceived need
to achieve a balance of power amongst states in the region. These
enhanced naval capabilities have the added bene?t of improving homeland security and maritime estate management, and helping to develop
security alliance relationships. Furthermore, the ability of the littoral
states to secure the Straits of Malacca has minimised the role of US and
other extra-regional navies, giving the states involved greater ?exibility
in an era of growing strategic rivalry between the US and China.
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| 14 |
ID:
131050
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The two leading Mediterranean powers in the post-Greek world clashed in three Punic Wars in the first of which Rome, now master of all Italy, overran Sicily, reinvented itself as a naval power and took its armies beyond Europe for the first time to Carthage in Africa
By the mid-3rd century BC, Romans had secured the whole of the Italian peninsula defeating in about 100 years every rival on mainland Italy. First the Latin League dissolved in the Latin War, then the Samnites were subjugated in three Samnite wars, and finally the cities of Magna Grecia submitted to Rome after Pyrrhus of Epirus withdrew (see FORCE May 2014). Barely decades after the last Pyrrhic War, Rome fought outside Italy for the first time. The First Punic War (264-241 BC) was the first of three fought between Carthage and the Roman Republic for supremacy in the western Mediterranean Sea. It was localised on the island of Sicily but Roman legions also landed on African soil. Carthage, located in today's Libya and Tunisia, was the world's leading naval power at that time. These wars were called 'Punic' from the Latin name for Carthaginians - 'Punici' derived from 'Phoenici' - who traced their origins to the Semitic-speaking peoples of North Africa descending from Phoenician traders of modern Lebanon and who spoke the Punic language. The Second Punic War (218-201 BC) is most remembered in military history for Hannibal's great crossing of the Alps with elephants to do what no man did before: attack Rome overland from the north. The Third Punic War (149-146 BC) involved an extended siege of Carthage, culminating in its conquest by Rome, ending the tale of one of the most illustrious military rivalries in history.
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| 15 |
ID:
128795
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| 16 |
ID:
171643
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| Summary/Abstract |
The sea has increased in importance as a source of useful resources. The nation that has control of its immediate and external seas is in a good position to choose how much or how little of sea resources it wants. It is the importance of the sea and the sea lines of communication to nations that has made thoughts such as maritime power, sea power, naval strategy … etc significant to them. The paper also examined the naval and constabulary relevance of the Nigerian Navy to its maritime environment. The study relied on primary and documentary data. The documentary data were sourced from books, newspapers and annual reports. The secondary sources used were subjected to textual and contextual evaluations. The primary sources was basically interviews with some important actors in the era. The paper’s study of the Nigerian Navy also identified the roles of a small navy and their importance to the maritime environment.
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| 17 |
ID:
173162
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| Summary/Abstract |
The sea has increased in importance as a source of useful resources. The nation that has control of its immediate and external seas is in a good position to choose how much or how little of sea resources it wants. It is the importance of the sea and the sea lines of communication to nations that has made thoughts such as maritime power, sea power, naval strategy … etc significant to them. The paper also examined the naval and constabulary relevance of the Nigerian Navy to its maritime environment. The study relied on primary and documentary data. The documentary data were sourced from books, newspapers and annual reports. The secondary sources used were subjected to textual and contextual evaluations. The primary sources was basically interviews with some important actors in the era. The paper’s study of the Nigerian Navy also identified the roles of a small navy and their importance to the maritime environment.
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| 18 |
ID:
150271
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| 19 |
ID:
115002
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aircraft carrier has been around in various forms since the First World
War. Its emergence as the key denominator of naval power is legendary, and
its continuing prestige in this role is even yet spawning building programs
among established and growing navies. The aircraft carrier is the largest and
most complex of all warships and in most cases the most expensive. In addition
to the cost of the ship itself, that of the embarked air wing must be considered,
not to mention the extensive logistics and training infrastructure needed to keep
carriers operating and useful. A recent Naval Postgraduate School study has
shown that approximately 46 percent of the Navy's personnel-officer, enlisted,
and civilian-are assigned to positions either on or supporting its carriers.
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these and other reasons, there has been almost constant debate over the past
ninety years within navies, between navies and air forces, and within governments over the advisability of investing in carriers. As the prospects for major
cutbacks in defense spending loom, the debate will again heat up. Both proponents and opponents of carriers have refined their arguments over the past nine
decades, but these are now starting to wear thin as the geopolitical environment
and the technology of war have changed. Also, the arguments both for and
against have tended toward the theological, with many tacit or unacknowledged
assumptions underpinning the argumentative maneuvers. In an attempt to improve the quality of the coming debates, this article will examine the prospects
for future utility of the ship type, including that of the embarked air wing, from
a different angle. Instead of making a holistic judgment on the future utility of
aircraft carriers, it will focus on the ways they have been, are, or could be used.
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| 20 |
ID:
130430
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