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1 |
ID:
075134
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2 |
ID:
146854
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Contents |
Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser served as the head of the Research Division for Military Intelligence of the Israel Defense Forces in 2005 at the time of the disengagement from Gaza and parts of Northern Samaria. Because of his special vantage point he is able to bring a new insight to the subject. Intelligence professionals were not consulted in the decision-making process. While the Prime Minister and his confidants hoped that this initiative would result in a political advantage for Israel and strengthen its security, it is clear that they did not take possible Arab and Palestinian reactions into account, particularly those of Hamas. In this article Brig.-Gen. Kuperwasser presents the issue of disengagement from a fresh perspective and describes its unintended consequences, which could have been foreseen.
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3 |
ID:
131272
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4 |
ID:
178299
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Summary/Abstract |
The deployment of special forces in hostile or politically volatile environments in search of strategic/operational intelligence, though not a 21st century novelty, appeared as a distinct military activity in literature only in the early 2000s under the label ‘Special Reconnaissance’ (SR). This article argues that the concept of SR (a) originated in the biblical Israelite military tradition and is depicted in the Bible as the lapis angularis of military strategy and a practice capable of dictating military and political norms; (b) has been used as a key element of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) modus operandi since 1948 thenceforth functioning in an analogous manner. To support these arguments, the theoretical and practical characteristics of Moses’ intelligence mission to Canaan as well as the IDF’s proclivity to SR are scrutinised under the general theoretical framework of political realism that assumes rational and pro-state interest course of actions. Accordingly, SR emerges as a distinctive common instrument of biblical and contemporary Israeli strategy, a fact that underlines the uninterrupted socio-political and cultural links between the past and the present of the Israeli ontology, this time via the wider concept of the Israeli military ethics.
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5 |
ID:
140092
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6 |
ID:
118035
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Publication |
New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2004.
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Description |
vii,326p.hbk
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Standard Number |
8170491924
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
057067 | 355.033073/LAT 057067 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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7 |
ID:
049832
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Publication |
New York, New Press, 2003.
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Description |
vi, 326p.
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Standard Number |
1565848624
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
047347 | 355.033073/LAT 047347 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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8 |
ID:
114203
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9 |
ID:
037313
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Publication |
Boulder, Westview Press, 1987.
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Description |
xiv, 303p.Pbk
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Standard Number |
0813374936
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
030208 | 940.5401/KIR 030208 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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10 |
ID:
112217
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Publication |
New Delhi, IDSA, 2012.
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Description |
112p.
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Standard Number |
9789382169031
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056519 | 327.1254/IDS 056519 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
056520 | 327.1254/IDS 056520 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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11 |
ID:
004518
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Publication |
Washington, DC, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994.
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Description |
XLVii,473p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
035314 | R 327.12/WAR 035314 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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12 |
ID:
168435
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Summary/Abstract |
Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.
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13 |
ID:
119140
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14 |
ID:
031540
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Publication |
Washington, Pergamon Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Incorporation, 1988.
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Description |
x, 157p.
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Standard Number |
0080347029
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
029653 | 327.12/GOD 029653 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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15 |
ID:
107245
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16 |
ID:
049085
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Publication |
London, Brassey's, 1998.
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Description |
Vol.4; xv, 341p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
1857531337
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
039504 | 623.7348/BRO 039504 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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17 |
ID:
083328
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 2008.
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Description |
xvii, 332p.
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Standard Number |
9780415349987
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
053839 | 327.12/HUG 053839 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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18 |
ID:
082815
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19 |
ID:
130879
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Combat, by its very definition, is an event extra-ordinarily excruciating. It is an ultimate condition that is distinguishable by its phenomenal characteristics which demand, among other undertakings, absolute perfection in marshalling the diverse elements of combat that constitute a military force, for example, troops, firepower, mobility and intelligence. Thus down the ages, 'Great Captains' of war have articulated their strategic intellect to secure victory, irrespective of the bulk of forces, by the best orchestration of the resources under their command. In modern times, developments in 'Information Warfare' have raised the bar of such Terrain intelligence has always been important for winning a battle. In this aricle, the writer advocates establishing a repository of battle-space geographic information called Military Geospatial Intelligence System (MGIS) orchestration to such a high level that it becomes possible to exploit to the hilt the individual capabilities of each element of the military machine. More importantly, it is possible now to seamlessly integrate all such diverse force-elements into one whole system of war-fighting. Military intelligence - terrestrial, strategic and tactical - has always been the most decisive factor in application of combat power as well as an enabling tool for the aforementioned 'best' orchestration of military resources. Within its overall ambit, terrain intelligence - geospatial intelligence in the wider sense as we understand today - has been the pivot of strategic, operational and tactical decision making. In the contemporary period of technological explosion, that pivot has assumed unlimited scope for articulation. At the crosshairs of ever-adversarial forces across terrains of unique descriptions, institution of an efficient mechanism for harnessing the properties of geospatial intelligence - MGIS - must, therefore, be a top priority for India. However, to be really effective, that endeavour has to be tailored to Indian conditions and backed up with indigenous competences; the scope and coverage of GIS as propounded by the lead militaries of the world, USA, China, NATO and Russia, is neither accessible nor sustainable and may not even be necessary in the context of India's technical-industrial-fiscal capacity, and inter alia, her military objectives.
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20 |
ID:
129244
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