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| 1 |
ID:
046920
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Manas Publicatons, 2001.
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| Description |
416p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
8170491282
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044149 | 923.554/BHA 044149 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
126118
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In an unexpected development, a Chinese border guards' platoon (30 soldiers) moved in and pitched tents 19 kilometres inside Indian territory at Depsang Valley overlooking Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO) on 15 April 2013 in Ladakh in the Western sector. The last time they did a similar thing was in 1986 in Sumdorong Chu in the Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh). Both times, the Chinese forces had blessings from the highest quarters: then supremo Deng Xiaoping and now the President and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping. Then, the Chinese were not a risen power and the occupation of Sumdorong Chu, of little tactical significance, was meant to test Indian gumption, through military coercion, after the passing away of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who Deng admired for being a strong and determined leader. There was a year-long stand-off with menacing military build-up on both sides ending in a mutually agreed disengagement with neither side looking a loser. The Chinese finally left Sumdorong Chu of own free accord in 1995. China's military coercion had not worked for two reasons: India showed political will, and China's military capability did not match its coercion.
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| 3 |
ID:
079368
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2008.
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| Description |
2 vol (x, 338p.)
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| Standard Number |
9788182743106
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052637 | 358.1703/MEH 052637 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
| 052638 | 358.1703/MEH 052638 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
002730
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1992.
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| Description |
x, 213p.
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| Contents |
Tenth Lok Sabha
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034180 | 355.6220954/IND 034180 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
105657
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| 6 |
ID:
002560
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| Publication |
DelhI, Pragati, 1992.
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| Description |
viii, 249p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
81-7307-001-6
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 033873 | 954.03/SIN 033873 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
096835
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| 8 |
ID:
125944
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the chief of army staff, General Bikram Singh assumed office in May last year amidst uncertainty and rising allegations of financial, disciplinary and moral impropriety within the service, he gave the call for 'Back to Basics'. Taking a cue from the chief, the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) has adopted this as its theme for the annual 2013-2014 journal, a tacit acknowledgement that the army has lost its moorings. Surely there are officers who understand that all is not well with the service and the drift, if not corrected, will have serious consequences.
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| 9 |
ID:
125927
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Even as the world is debating implications of Pakistan's signalling that it has developed theatre or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), India's response, so far, has been implausible at best, and nonchalant at worst. At the political or strategic level, the Chairman, National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran has sought to make a case that India's nuclear weapons are not symbolic but are meant for deterrence. At the military or operational level, the Indian Army, most affected by this new weapon has adopted a dismissive and cavalier attitude. 'We are not sure if this is a bluff, and even if it is not, we do not envisage changing our offensive plans,' is the overriding sentiment at the Army Headquarters. Both stakeholders need to think carefully about a befitting and proportionate response to Pakistan Army's game-changer.
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| 10 |
ID:
093156
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