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| 1 |
ID:
130121
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| 2 |
ID:
187468
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| 3 |
ID:
109034
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| 4 |
ID:
139185
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to analyse the lessons of the 1965 Indo-Pak war that are applicable today. It finds that the current army doctrine, Cold Start, has some similarities to the opening round of the 1965 war. It argues that even the attritionist strategy adopted in 1965 may have more to give today than the manoeuvre war approach of its more famous successor, the 1971 war. In particular, the article appraises Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s firm political control during the war and finds that it was ably reinforced by the prime ministers who were at the helm in India’s later wars. Knowing when to stop is key to avoiding nuclear thresholds, and in that the 1965 war, which stopped short of decisive victory, serves as a suitable precedent to potential future conflicts.
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| 5 |
ID:
121654
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| 6 |
ID:
139184
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1965 Indo-Pak War came when India was in the midst of a major military expansion. India did not want to escalate matters when Pakistani forces invaded Kutch in April 1965 and accepted a ceasefire with British mediation. Although the government allowed the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft on 1 September 1965, action remained localised to the Chhamb area for five days. This was primarily because of India’s desire to avoid all-out war. IAF was used for counter air, air defence, and in support of the ground forces. Poor communications with the Army, lack of joint planning, an almost total absence of early warning and ground controlled interception (GCI) radars meant that its overall performance was sub-optimal. Despite these self-imposed restraints, India succeeded in thwarting Pakistan’s efforts to grab Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by force, and to that extent the war did become a limited victory for India.
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| 7 |
ID:
106850
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| 8 |
ID:
104514
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| 9 |
ID:
122413
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| 10 |
ID:
096703
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.
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| 11 |
ID:
154678
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| 12 |
ID:
111051
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| 13 |
ID:
139760
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| Summary/Abstract |
Time magazine aptly summarised the operational performance and preparedness of the Indian Army during the 1962 conflict. That may not be true today for the armed forces, but may still hold good to a large extent for the Indian soldier and the infantry. Former army chief, General V.K. Singh, in a much publicised 12 March 2012 letter to the then Prime Minister, painted a grim picture of the operational capabilities of the 1.18-million-strong army. The critical voids highlighted in this letter included ammunition, artillery guns, obsolete air defence systems and above all a lack of adequate weapons for infantry and Special Forces battalions. A major concern expressed in the letter was, ‘large scale voids in essential weaponry as well as critical surveillance and night-fighting capabilities in the over 350 infantry and Special Forces’ battalions.’
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| 14 |
ID:
119340
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| 15 |
ID:
150835
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| 16 |
ID:
110674
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| 17 |
ID:
131294
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| Publication |
London, Bloomsbury, 2013.
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| Description |
xi, 238p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781441177308
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057785 | 954.03/ROY 057785 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
102194
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| 19 |
ID:
102184
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| 20 |
ID:
130079
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Artillery modernisation in India implies the largest modernisation of this arm and needs to be given as much, it not more, importance commensurate with the man oeuvre arms it supports. The relevance is more in the Indian context because of the mountainous terrain where it needs to support infantry operations plus in counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations. Unquestionably, artillery units will continue to be used to support the infantry to the benefit at all. It is precisely in these sorts of operation that the new precision of artillery will become more telling and relevant. India has a long way to go in modernising its artillery. Presently, the artillery modernisation plan appears to be stymied. There is an urgent need to provide it an impetus considering the enhanced threat posed to us along a two and a halt front.
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