| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
020473
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| Publication |
July-Aug 2001.
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| Description |
22-29
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| 2 |
ID:
100467
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| 3 |
ID:
066985
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| 4 |
ID:
132358
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How and to what extent is the preventive use of force becoming the future of foreign policy for states around the world? We explore the spread of preventive logic to increasing numbers of states and examine the degree to which an international norm toward preventive self-defense is cascading in the international system. Through content and comparative case study analysis, we investigate leaders' rhetoric and security policies concerning what we theorize is the key indicator of a country's emulation of the United States: assertion of the right to the unilateral, preventive use of force outside of its borders. Our evidence indicates that there has been a shift away from the established international norm-which considers the use of preventive force illegal and illegitimate-toward growing acceptance of unilateral preventive strategies, a shift largely propelled by the precedents set by the United States in the war in Iraq and its use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) in the global war on terror. Our findings also reveal that some states are applying the strategy of preventive self-defense beyond the use of UAVs for targeted killings to the extreme contingency plan for nuclear war. We conclude by discussing possibilities for further research and considering the implications of this phenomenon.
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| 5 |
ID:
063840
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| 6 |
ID:
124855
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article develops a mathematical modeling framework using fault trees and Poisson processes for analyzing the risks of inadvertent nuclear war from U.S. or Russian misinterpretation of false alarms in early warning systems, and for assessing the potential value of options to reduce the risks of inadvertent nuclear war. The model also uses publicly available information on early warning systems, near-miss incidents, and other factors to estimate probabilities of a U.S.-Russia crisis, the rates of false alarms, and the probabilities that leaders will launch missiles in response to a false alarm. The article discusses results, uncertainties, limitations, and policy implications.
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| 7 |
ID:
119738
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| 8 |
ID:
111183
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet 'war talk' as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet-American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation. Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.
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| 9 |
ID:
134047
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The South Asian security landscape is increasingly dominated by a complex four-way dynamic between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The stresses and strains of the relationships between these states directly affect the prospects for peace and prosperity for almost half of humanity. This article describes some of the military contours of this landscape, with a focus on strategic postures, weapon acquisitions, and the role of nuclear weapons. It maps the India-Pakistan arms race over the past decade, the economic constraints on the two states, the role of China and the United States as weapons suppliers, and the risk and consequences for nuclear war. The authors then look at India's relationship with China, which is marked by both cooperation and competition, and the rise of China as a close military, political, and economic ally of Pakistan. While the United States has had long-standing cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan, these relationships have been undergoing major shifts over the last two decades. U.S. concerns about China's increasing military and economic power have also intensified over this period as well. Of particular significance has been the effort to create a U.S.-India strategic partnership to balance and contain a rising China, which may become a central feature of the emerging global order. This article also offers a brief overview of what is publicly known about the nuclear arsenals of the four countries, ongoing production of weapons-usable fissile materials in Pakistan and India, as well as the race to build longer-range missiles.
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| 10 |
ID:
002603
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| Publication |
Bradford, School of Peace Studies.University of Bradford, 1989.
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| Description |
74p.
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| Series |
Peace research report; no. 23
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 030593 | 355.825119/COW 030593 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
094155
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| 12 |
ID:
090288
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| 13 |
ID:
131417
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article argues that the century from 1945 is likely to prove seminal in terms of human progress. It marks the period when the human community has to come to terms with its capacity for self-destruction through the invention of weapons of mass destruction and its ability to exceed the homeostatic capabilities of the global ecosystem in an era of deep socio-economic divisions. Two-thirds of the way through this century the progress has been mixed. Nuclear war has been avoided more by luck than by wisdom, there remain risks of nuclear proliferation and it is not evident that humankind has acquired the ability to deal with the destructive potential of bio-, nano- and other emerging technologies. Recognition of the extent of anthropogenic impacts on ecosystem stability is evident, but not at the level necessary for the radical responses required. Even so, there are signs of progress and potential for change, suggesting that the final one-third of the century will be singularly important in ensuring long-term emancipation and environmental sustainability.
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| 14 |
ID:
140246
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Progressive People's Sector Publications (p) Ltd., 1976.
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| Description |
216p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 029472 | 951.058/SHA 029472 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
114851
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| 16 |
ID:
172904
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| 17 |
ID:
059246
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| 18 |
ID:
063222
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| 19 |
ID:
063185
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| 20 |
ID:
097369
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on "performative power"-the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global "war on terror," the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008-09 operation "Cast Lead" in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.
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