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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
038719
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| Publication |
London, Macmillan, 1973.
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| Description |
viii, 572p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
333124138
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 013404 | 923.241/MAC 013404 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
124578
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The debate around humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect generally concerns a collective action problem on the international level: motivating states to participate in a multilateral coalition to stop a mass atrocity. This debate presupposes that states enjoy a domestic consensus about their rights and responsibilities to intervene. This article reconsiders this assumption and examines the sources of domestic political will for intervention, particularly the role of partisanship, ideology, and public opinion on Congressional members' willingness to support US intervention for humanitarian purposes. We analyze several Congressional votes relevant to four episodes of US humanitarian intervention: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. We find that public support for humanitarian intervention increases Congressional support and that other political demands, primarily partisanship and ideological distance from the president, often trump the normative exigencies of intervention. Our findings shed light on the domestic political dynamics behind humanitarian intervention and can help explain why some recent humanitarian missions have proceeded without seeking Congressional approval.
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| 3 |
ID:
038717
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| Publication |
London, Macmillan, 1971.
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| Description |
viii, 786p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
333103106
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 007448 | 923.241/MAC 007448 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
038720
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| Publication |
London, Macmillann, 1969.
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| Description |
xx, 729p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 003689 | 923.241/MAC 003689 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
124654
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
People routinely blame politics for outcomes they don't like, often with good reason: when the dolt in the cubicle down the hall gets a promotion because he plays golf with the boss, when a powerful senator delivers pork-barrel spending to his home state, when a well-connected entrepreneur obtains millions of dollars in government subsidies to build factories that will probably never become competitive enterprises. Yet conventional wisdom holds that politics is not at fault when it comes to banking crises and that such crises instead result from unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances.
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